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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
  
 
 
ESSAYS ON CAPITAL CONTROLS AND EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES 
 
 This dissertation consists of three essays on capital controls and exchange rate 
regimes. The first essay, under the background of international monetary policy trilemma, 
empirically investigates the validity of the proposition that holding the degree of 
exchange rate stability constant, a decrease in capital mobility through imposition of 
capital controls will enhance monetary independence. Using a panel dataset covering 88 
countries for the 1995-2010 period and system GMM estimation, this paper finds that 1) 
capital controls help improve a country’s monetary independence; 2) the effectiveness of 
capital controls depends on the types of assets and the direction of flows they are 
imposed; 3) the choice of exchange rate regime has important impact on the effectiveness 
of capital controls on monetary independence. 
 The second essay examines the role of capital controls on economic growth. 
Conventional wisdom suggests that allowing international capital flows improves 
domestic investment and growth by providing extra resources through international 
capital market, yet the flows can be misallocated to finance speculative or low-quality 
domestic investments. Using a panel dataset covering 78 countries over 1995-2009, this 
paper finds that 1) capital control policies promote economic growth after taking into 
account a country’s de facto level of capital flows; 2) controls on capital inflows helps a 
country’s economic growth, but not controls on outflows; 3) restrictions on different asset 
types affect growth differently. Capital controls on equity type flows are less effective 
than controls on debt type flows or direct investment. 
 The third examines the role of exchange rate flexibility on current account 
balances. Global imbalances have become an important issue for economists and policy 
makers. Greater exchange rate flexibility is often suggested as a means to achieve faster 
and more efficient adjustment in the current account. However, previous empirical 
studies show little support for this hypothesis. This essay revisits this issue with a large 
panel dataset and Threshold VAR model and finds that 1) the speed of the current 
account adjustment is higher in a regime with greater exchange rate variability; 2) some 
existing popular exchange rate classifications may not capture actual exchange rate 
variability as well as expected. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
This dissertation consists of three essays on capital controls and exchange rate 
regimes. In the first two essays, I focus on the effects of government controls on capital 
movements and their effects on monetary policy making and long-term growth. Capital 
movement across countries has numerous benefits including consumption smoothing, 
improvement in domestic investment and growth potential. In a world with financial 
market imperfections, however, unrestricted capital flows may cause important 
macroeconomic problems such as undesired currency appreciation and inflation pressure 
of domestic country. It is widely agreed that major financial crises in the past two 
decades including the recent global financial crisis are closely related to massive 
increases in capital movement after a series of financial market liberalization in a number 
of countries. Thus, designing a more stable international financial system and regulating 
international capital movements became a pressing issue. In particular, the first essay 
studies the effectiveness of capital controls on monetary policy autonomy given the 
international macroeconomic trilemma constraint. The second essay investigates the 
impact of capital controls on economic growth. In addition to capital controls, exchange 
rate arrangement is also a perennial issue in international economics. This issue has been 
of particular interests along with persistent global imbalances. Many policy makers and 
economists believe that flexible exchange rate can facilitate current account adjustment 
since Friedman (1953) first made this proposition in 1950s. However, disagreement 
exists among economists (i.e. see Chinn and Wei, forthcoming). Given this background, 
the third essay examines whether exchange rate flexibility can play a role in the current 
account adjustment. This chapter provides a brief introduction to each of the three assays. 
In my first essay, I investigate the role of capital controls in the context of the 
international monetary policy trilemma. According to the trilemma, there is a tradeoff 
among three policy objectives: monetary policy independence, exchange rate stability, 
and unrestricted capital mobility. A country cannot have all three at the same time. If any 
two are chosen, the other has to be sacrificed. As most governments pursue independent 
monetary policy for domestic stabilization purposes and more stable exchange rates, the 
trilemma suggests that some restrictions on capital movement are inevitable. In this essay, 
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I investigate an aspect of the hypothesis that has received relatively little attention thus 
far: whether a decrease in capital mobility through imposition of capital controls, while 
holding the degree of exchange rate stability constant, will enhance monetary 
independence. Using a novel panel dataset covering 88 countries for the 1995-2010 
period with system GMM estimation, the essay finds that 1) capital controls help improve 
a country’s monetary independence; 2) the effectiveness of capital controls depends on 
the types of assets and the direction of flows they are imposed; and 3) the choice of 
exchange rate regime seems to have important impact on the effectiveness of capital 
controls on monetary independence. This result suggests that policy makers may consider 
capital controls as a tool to obtain more monetary policy autonomy.  
In my second essay, I consider long-term effects of capital controls – economic 
growth. Conventional wisdom suggests that allowing high level of international capital 
flows improves domestic investment and growth by providing extra resources through 
international capital market. Yet international capital flows can be misallocated to finance 
speculative or low-quality domestic investments, which cannot promote a long-run 
economic growth. How capital controls will empirically affect economic growth is more 
of interest. Using a panel dataset covering 78 countries for the 1995-2009 period and 
system GMM estimation, this paper finds that that 1) capital control policies promote 
economic growth after taking into account a country’s de facto level of capital flows. As 
the same time, higher de facto capital flows is associated with higher growth rate. The 
positive effect of capital controls will be weakened as de facto level of capital flows 
increases. 2) Controls on capital inflows do help a country’s economic growth, yet 
controls on outflows have little impact on growth. Again, de facto level of capital flows 
will weaken the positive effect of capital controls on inflows. 3) Restrictions on different 
asset types affect differently on growth. Capital controls on equity type flows impede 
growth; controls on debt type flows promote growth; controls on direct investment have 
positive but insignificant effects on growth.  
In my third essay, I study a controversial question – does greater exchange rate 
flexibility promote the adjustment in the current account? Flexible exchange rate has long 
been asserted as a must-keep tool to facilitate the current account adjustment. In contrast, 
some studies show that exchange rate flexibility does not matter for the current account 
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adjustment using some widely used exchange rate regime classification. However, results 
from my essay suggest that the statement that greater exchange rate flexibility promotes 
the adjustment in the current account still holds. In particular, my study distinguishes 
exchange rate flexibility and exchange rate regime classification and finds that some 
widely used classifications may not fully capture exchange rate flexibility as clear as 
people think. After a full consideration of exchange rate flexibility, using the threshold 
VAR technique and a large panel dataset covering 90 countries for the period 1980-2010, 
the essay finds a strong positive link between exchange rate flexibility and the speed of 
the current account adjustment.  
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Chapter Two 
Do capital controls enhance monetary independence? 
2.1. Introduction 
According to the international monetary policy trilemma, policymakers 
simultaneously may achieve any two, but not all, of the following three goals, 1) 
exchange rate stability; 2) unrestricted movement in international capital; and 3) 
monetary policy autonomy. The first goal, exchange rate stability, requires a fixed or 
heavily managed exchange rate regime. The second goal, free capital mobility, is usually 
associated with elimination of exchange controls on cross-border movement of 
international capital. The third goal, monetary policy autonomy is conceptual and thus 
difficult to define. Usually if a country can easily implement its own monetary policy 
without being forced to follow another country’s monetary policy, it is considered to have 
a high level of monetary independence. One of most popular measures of monetary 
independence is deviation of the domestic interest rate from the foreign or base rate. 
Aizenman et al (2008), Frankel et al (2004), and Shambaugh (2004) examine monetary 
independence using this metric.  
Previous studies in the trilemma mostly focus on the relationship between the 
exchange rate regime and monetary policy independence. See, inter alia, di Giovanni and 
Schambaugh (2008), Bluedorn and Bowdler (2010), Frankel et al (2004), and 
Schambaugh (2004). Most studies assume high capital mobility especially when 
industrialized economies are under consideration. In this case, the trilemma is reduced a 
simpler dilemma between exchange rate stability and monetary independence. For 
various reasons, however, the tradeoff between capital mobility and monetary 
independence – for instance, whether introducing more stringent capital controls will 
enhance monetary independence – has been underexplored. An important reason may be 
measurement of capital mobility. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
capital flows can be roughly categorized as portfolio flows (equity and bond), direct 
investment, and other financial flows. In addition, each main category can contain many 
subsets. This complexity of measurement makes capital mobility more difficult to 
quantify than monetary independence and the exchange rate regime.  
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The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether capital control policies enhance 
monetary independence in the context of the trilemma. Given that capital flows can take 
many different forms, it is of great interest to understand whether the effectiveness of 
capital controls depends on the type of financial assets they are imposed and whether 
controls on capital inflows and outflows have different effects. Instead of using an 
aggregate measure of capital controls as most existing studies do, we thus adopt a set of 
disaggregate capital control variables to measure the effectiveness of capital controls. We 
also employ dynamic panel-data system generalized method of moments (GMM) 
estimation to analyze a panel annual dataset covering 88 countries during the 1995-2010 
period.  
Main findings of this paper include 1) capital controls help improve a country’s 
monetary independence, which is consistent with the trilemma theory; 2) the 
effectiveness of capital controls depends on the type of assets and direction of flows they 
are imposed; 3) the choice of exchange rate regime seems to have important impact on 
the effectiveness of capital controls on monetary independence. 
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of 
literature in related fields. Section 3 describes the methodology and the dataset. Section 4 
reports the main results. Section 5 reports the robustness of the results. Section 6 
concludes. 
2.2 Literature review 
 Free and unrestricted movement of international capital has both benefits and 
costs. Benefits of allowing a high level of international capital flows include consumption 
smoothing, improvement in domestic investment and growth potential. On the other hand, 
international capital flows may generate undesirable outcomes especially when they are 
large and sudden. Magud et al (2011) summarize four important side effects of capital 
flows in terms of “four fears”. They are 1) fear of appreciation of the domestic currency; 
2) fear of “hot money” or volatile short-term capital flows that could be very destructive 
to the real economy; 3) fear of large inflows, which can fuel asset price bubbles and 
encourage excessive risk taking by cash-rich domestic intermediaries; 4) fear of loss of 
monetary autonomy which may arise if huge capital flows weaken the flexibility of 
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domestic monetary policy. These fears may rationalize the increasingly wider use of 
capital controls across countries. Even the IMF comes to view capital controls more 
favorably than before. It is now developing Framework to Manage Capital Inflows (IMF, 
2011).1
This paper investigates empirical evidence regarding the fear of loss of monetary 
autonomy due to greater capital mobility. It can fit into two broad strands of literature: 1) 
the study of trilemma or tradeoffs among the three policy goals; and 2) the study of the 
effectiveness of capital controls. In the context of the trilemma, most studies pay 
attention to the relation between the exchange rate regime and monetary independence. 
Shambaugh (2004) investigates how fixed exchange rates affect monetary policy using 
the data of 155 countries over period 1973-2000. He finds that fixed exchange rates 
involve a loss of monetary policy autonomy. In particular, a country with fixed exchange 
rate regime has its nominal interest rate follow that of a base country more closely than a 
country which does not fix its exchange rate. Shambaugh (2004) also considers the 
effects of capital controls using IMF’s binary (aggregate) dummy variables. He finds a 
positive effect of capital controls on monetary independence, although the coefficient 
estimates are statistically insignificant.   
 
Frankel et al (2004) explore the impact of exchange rate regime on the sensitivity 
of local interest rates to international interest rates using 46 developing and industrialized 
economies during 1976–1996. They find that in the 1990s all exchange rate regimes 
exhibit high sensitivity of local interest rates to international ones in the long run even for 
countries with floating regimes. In the short run, however, interest rates of countries with 
more flexible regimes adjust more slowly to changes in international rates, implying 
some room for monetary independence. However, the paper does not explicitly consider 
the role of capital controls. Instead, it roughly distinguishes degree of world capital 
mobility by dividing the whole sample into three sub-periods under the assumption that 
capital mobility is higher in the more recent period.  
                                                            
1 Recent Experiences in Managing Capital Inflows—Cross-Cutting Themes and Possible Policy 
Framework  
Prepared by the Strategy, Policy, and Review Department, IMF (2011) 
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Bluedorn and Bowdler (2010) investigate the relationship between monetary 
independence and exchange rate regime by distinguishing monetary policy in base 
country (the US) into identified, unanticipated, and exogenous interest rate changes and 
study how different types of interest rate changes may affect home country’s monetary 
policy. Yet, the paper fails to address the complexity of capital controls by using a single 
binary measure. 
Unlike the above papers, some studies explicitly consider the framework of the 
trilemma in which all three aspects of the policy tradeoffs are explicitly taken into 
account. Using a panel of data from 22 countries between 1967 and 1992, Rose (1996) 
finds little evidence of an obvious tradeoff between fixed exchange rates, capital mobility, 
and monetary independent. However, as argued by Obstfeld et al (2005), the measure of 
monetary independence in the paper is obtained from the monetary models of the 
exchange rate, which yields limited credibility when identifying monetary policy shocks. 
Aizenman et al (2010) construct a continuous index for each variable of the trilemma. 
They find that the weighted sum of the three indexes adds up to a constant, confirming 
the idea that a rise in one trilemma variable should be traded-off with a drop of the 
weighted sum of the other two. Interestingly, they use a continuous index of financial 
openness rather than a binary dummy variable to proxy the extent of a country’s capital 
mobility. Obstfeld et al (2005) use an interwar (1919-1938) annual dataset from 16 
countries to explicitly investigate the trilemma. The analysis of interwar data finds strong 
support for the logic of the trilemma. A drawback of their dataset is a limited coverage of 
countries. The paper covers much less countries than the previous two papers. Also, the 
measurement of capital controls in the paper still suffers the same problem as does 
Shambaugh (2004). Miniane and Rogers (2007) examine the trilemma using a structural 
vector autoregressive model. They deal with capital controls by roughly splitting sample 
countries into high capital control group and low capital control group.  
In sum, a common issue facing the above papers, except for Rose (1996), is that 
they typically use a coarse measure of capital controls. As a result, the empirical results 
provide little guideline to policymakers on the effectiveness of different capital control 
policies. If the government decides to regulate capital flows, should it choose to impose 
restrictions on bonds or equities, or direct investment? Do restrictions on inflow or 
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outflow make difference? These questions cannot be answered from the papers 
mentioned in the above. Another important problem of these papers is that they fail to 
address potential endogeneity and reverse causation issues. For instance, a country may 
choose to employ capital restrictions because it lacks monetary autonomy. A two-way 
causality between capital controls and monetary independence could undermine the 
legitimacy of conclusions made in these papers.  
Another strand of literature considering the impact of capital controls on monetary 
policy deals with the effectiveness of various capital control measures. Most studies in 
the field try to answer the question of interest using individual-country case study. Often 
they consider very specific control policies and look at the “treatment effect” of these 
policies on the economy. Edison and Reinhart (2001), De Gregorio et al (2000), Kaplan 
and Rodrik (2002), Valdes-Prieto and Soto (1998), and many other studies provide 
evidence that capital controls positively affect monetary independence. Despite the 
interesting results, these studies are only limited to a small number of countries such as 
Malaysia and Chile. Only a small number of papers such as Montiel and Reinhart (1999) 
and Binici et al (2010) consider multiple countries while keeping a detailed measure of 
capital controls. Yet their research interest is the link between capital controls and the 
volume and composition of capital inflows and outflows. Although they consider a more 
specific set of capital control policies, they are silent about the effect of capital controls 
on monetary independence. 
2.3. Data 
Our annual panel dataset covers 88 countries for the 1995-2010 period. (See Table 
2.8 for the list of countries.) Monetary independence is the ability of a country to set its 
own monetary policy for domestic purposes independent of external monetary influences. 
As monetary policy usually takes the form of interest rate targeting, an intuitive measure 
of monetary independence would be the difference of interest rate between the home 
country and the base country (or the rest of the world). We employ the methodology 
developed by Aizenman et al (2010) and define monetary independence for country 𝑖 as 
follows: 
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𝑀𝐼 =  1 −  
𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑟𝑖 , 𝑟𝑏) + 1
2
 
where corr(𝑟𝑖 , 𝑟𝑏) is measure the correlation of the monthly interest rates between the 
home country and the base country, denoted as 𝑏. Money market rates are used as the 
interest rate. By construction, the maximum and minimum values are 1 and 0, 
respectively. A higher value of the index means a lower correlation of interest rates and 
thus greater monetary policy independence. 
For the measurement of capital controls, we follow the methodology developed by 
Schindler (2009). The original data source is from IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). Before 1995, AREAER reports 
each country’s overall capital controls status using one single dummy; since 1995, the 
variable breaks down to many categories according to capital flows’ asset type, 
ownership, or direction of flows. Using the information on capital controls from IMF’s 
AREAER for the period from 1995 to 2005, Schindler first codes the restrictiveness of 
different types of capital controls at the level of individual transactions, and then takes 
average of these subindices to obtain more finely gradated asset or inflow/outflow 
specific indices. For example, equity transactions are classified into four types: residents 
buying or selling assets abroad, and nonresidents selling or buying domestic assets. Each 
of these basic transactions is coded as “1” if restrictions exist and “0” otherwise. Thus, an 
aggregate equity controls index would be the average of four binary variables and could 
thus take on five different values: 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, or 1. The equity inflow and outflow 
indices, respectively, are the average of two underlying transaction variables, thus 
potentially assuming three values: 0, 0.5, or 1. We update the data to 2010. 
For the measure of exchange rate regime, we follow the binary classification of 
Klein and Shambaugh (2008). A fixed exchange rate regime (𝑃𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡 = 1) is defined as a 
situation where, over the course of a calendar year, the month-end bilateral exchange rate 
with the base country stays within a 2% band; 𝑃𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡 = 0 otherwise. Klein and 
Shambaugh’s study covers data up to 2006. This paper updates to 2010. 
Monetary independence may be affected by other variables including inflation rate, 
trade openness, financial development, and relative income. Inflation, especially when it 
is high, is a sign of loss of monetary control. Previous literature finds a negative 
10 
 
correlation between inflation rate and indicators of central bank independence. See, inter 
alia, Alesina and Summers (1993) and Cukierman et al (1992). In other words, the central 
bank of a higher inflation country is more likely to have a lower degree of independence 
from domestic political pressure. The external degree of monetary independence – the 
subject of this study – is also likely to be lower if the country hopes to borrow the 
reputation of low inflation policy of the base country by tying its currency to that of the 
base country.  
International trade is an important channel of transmission of external influences. 
Trade openness –defined as the ratio of the sum of imports and exports to GDP – is likely 
to be positively related to the extent of the country’s exposure to foreign shocks including 
foreign monetary policy and the monetary policy linkage, which lowers monetary 
independence. (Shambaugh 2004) Financial development – proxied by the private 
credit/GDP ratio − is often associated with financial integration with the world financial 
market, which tends to expose the country to international financial market shocks. This 
suggests that financial development is likely to lower monetary independence. The effect 
of relative income on monetary independence is ambiguous. A high-income country 
tends to be more open in trade and finance and therefore may interact with the above-
mentioned factors. At the same time, a more advanced country is also likely to wish to 
exert its own monetary policy instead of being imposed by foreign policy decisions.  
Data for inflation, trade openness, and relative income are obtained from Penn 
World Table 7.0; the measure of financial development is from World Development 
Indicators (WDI). Table 2.1 provides the summary statistics. Note that the trilemma 
variables range from 0 to 1 by construction. The mean of capital control variables is 0.36, 
suggesting that countries maintain some restrictions on capital flows but do not heavily 
rely on capital controls. The mean of exchange rate stability is 0.36, which implies that 
more than one third of the observations adopt a fixed exchange rate regime. Other 
variables including inflation, relative income, financial development, and trade openness 
have reasonable ranges. No obvious outliers are detected in the dataset. 
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2.4. Methodology 
The following regression equation is estimated to investigate the effectiveness of 
capital control policies on monetary independence in the context of the trilemma. 
𝑀𝐼𝑖𝑡 = Constant + 𝛽 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿 𝑃𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡 +  𝛾 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡                  (1) 
𝑀𝐼𝑖𝑡 is a country 𝑖’s level of monetary independence in year t , 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 is a vector of 
various capital control variables. In some regressions, we also employ an aggregate 
measure of capital controls instead. 𝑃𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡 is a binary control variable, which measures a 
country’s exchange rate regime. (𝑃𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡 = 1 for a fixed exchange rate regime and 0 
otherwise.) 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a group of control variables, including per capita income level relative 
to the US, trade openness, inflation rate and a measure of financial development.  
 Shambaugh (2004) uses a framework similar to Eq. (1). There are three notable 
differences between the his specification and ours. First, the measurement of monetary 
independence is different. He uses the interest rate differential between a country and its 
base country. This paper uses monetary independence developed by Aizenman et al 
(2010), which is based on the correlation of interest rates between the home and the base 
countries. Second, this paper uses a more disaggregated set of capital control variables 
based on their asset categories and types of flow, while Shambaugh (2004) uses a single 
aggregated capital control variable. Third, we employs a more sophisticated econometric 
method of estimation than the basic ordinary least squares used by Shambaugh (2004) 
which may suffer from omitted variable biases and endogeneity problems. Admittedly, it 
is very difficult to identify all possible explanatory variables for monetary independence. 
The explanatory variables that can be identified and included in the regression are limited 
and the omitted variable bias may be inevitable. For instance, a country’s government can 
influence central bank’s policy-making and further affect its monetary policy autonomy. 
Missing the proxy to measure a government’s intervention may lead to an omitted 
variable bias. One could consider fixed effect panel regression, such as least-squares 
dummy variable (LSDV) regression. This apporach can remove some time-invariant 
individual fixed effect, largely mitigate the omitted variable bias, and provide less biased 
results. However, it cannot overcome the potential endogeneity problems. Some variables 
in Eq. (1) are likely to have endogeneity issues. For example, monetary independence and 
12 
 
inflation may affect each other in both directions. A country could try to control inflation 
by following another country’s monetary policy, which, in turn, implies that high 
inflation leads to low monetary independence. Another example is capital controls: a 
country may choose its polices including capital controls in order to achieve a certain 
level of monetary independence. These econometric issues can be addressed with 
dynamic panel data system GMM estimation methodology pioneered by Arellano-Bond 
(1991), Arellano-Bover (1995), and Blundell-Bond (1998).2 3
2.5. Results 
 
2.5.1 Preliminary Analyses 
 Table 2.2 lists correlations among capital restrictions on various types of assets. 
Most correlations are high, suggesting that a country imposing capital restriction on one 
asset type, say, equities, is likely to impose restriction on the other types as well, say, 
bonds and direct investment. Table 2.3 reports correlations among capital restrictions on 
the direction of flows in addition to the type of assets. Within each asset type, 
correlations between inflow and outflow are also high except for direct investment, 
especially its inflows. It is not difficult to find reasons for relatively low correlation of 
restrictions on direct investment and other types of capital flows. In general, portfolio 
                                                            
2 System GMM estimation can be used to deal with a general model as follows: 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡; 
𝜖𝑖𝑡 =  𝜇𝑖 + 𝜐𝑖𝑡 ; 𝐸(𝜇𝑖𝑡) =  𝐸(𝜐𝑖𝑡) = 𝐸(𝜇𝑖𝑡𝜐𝑖𝑡) = 0; where the disturbance term has two orthogonal 
components: the fixed effects, 𝜇𝑖, and the idiosyncratic shocks, 𝜐𝑖𝑡. The estimation addresses omitted 
variable bias by construction: system GMM uses data transformations such as first difference or 
“orthogonal deviations” for each individual to remove individual fixed effect. For instance, using first 
differences, 𝛥𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝛥𝑥𝑖𝑡 +  𝛥𝜐𝑖𝑡. The individual fixed effect, 𝜇𝑖, is removed from the model. Second, if 
some explanatory variables may be endogenous, the lagged values of these explanatory variables are used 
as instruments for estimation. In this way, potential endogeneity problems can be mitigated. Moreover, 
Windmeijer (2005) devises a small-sample correction to improve the accuracy of the standard errors 
provided by the estimation, which makes the estimation more practical. Overall, system GMM estimation 
provides less biased results than general estimation methods such as pooled OLS or LSDV.  
3 To use GMM estimation, it is important to check the validity of moment conditions. An important 
advantage of system GMM is that it can use lagged values of explanatory variables as instruments to deal 
with potential endogeneity issues. However, it relies on the assumption that changes in the instrumenting 
variables 𝜔𝑖𝑡 are uncorrelated with the individual fixed effects: 𝐸(𝛥𝜔𝑖𝑡𝜇𝑖𝑡) = 0 for all i and t. If this holds, 
then 𝛥𝜔𝑖,𝑡−1 is a valid instrument for the endogenous variables in levels: 𝐸�𝛥𝜔𝑖,𝑡−1𝜖𝑖𝑡� = 𝐸�𝛥𝜔𝑖,𝑡−1𝜇𝑖𝑡� +
 𝐸�𝜔𝑖,𝑡−1𝜐𝑖𝑡� − 𝐸(𝜔𝑖,𝑡−2𝜐𝑖𝑡) = 0. In the context of this paper, the estimation needs changes of inflation 
rate and capital controls to be orthogonal to the country fixed effect. This assumption holds since inflation 
stabilization and capital control policies are common tools for any countries. 
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flows involving purchase of stocks and bonds tend to be more short-term oriented while 
direct investment is more long-term oriented.    
2.5.2 Main Results 
Table 2.4 reports the main results of the regression analysis estimated by dynamic 
panel-data system GMM that allows for fixed effects and addresses the endogeneity 
problems of explanatory variables. This paper uses the following specification for 
estimation.  
MIit =  αi + β CCit + λCCit ∗ Pegit +  γ Xit + ϵit       (2) 
where i and t denote country and year. MIit is monetary independence as defined in 
equation (1). CCit is a vector of capital control variables. We consider three different 
levels of aggregate measurement for capital controls: (a) overall measure; (b) capital 
controls on three different types of capital flows as defined in Table 1 (equity + collective 
investment, bond + financial credit, and direct investment); (c) controls on inflows and 
outflows for each the 3 types of capital inflows. Thus in (c), there are six different capital 
control dummy variables in the equation. Eq (2) also examines the effects of capital 
controls when they are used in combination with the fixed exchange rate regime. Xit is a 
group of control variables which are potential determinants of monetary independence, 
including the level of income, inflation, the exchange rate regime (Pegit = 1 for a fixed 
exchange rate), trade openness (“openc”) as measured by the sum of exports and imports 
to GDP and the extent of financial development (“fin dvp”). The latter is defined as 
private credit to GDP ratio. 
First, lagged values (up to 5 periods) instrument capital controls and inflation in 
order to mitigate potential endogeneity issues. Second, orthogonal deviations data 
transformation is used to accommodate unbalanced panels, because first difference 
amplifies gaps in unbalanced panels. For instance, if some 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is missing, then neither 
𝛥𝑦𝑖𝑡 nor 𝛥𝑦𝑖,𝑡+1 can be constructed using first difference. Instead, orthogonal deviations 
let each observation subtract the average of all future available observations of a variable. 
It is computable for all observations except the last one, so it minimizes data loss. Third, 
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two-step estimation and small sample correction are used to improve the accuracy and 
efficiency of the estimation.4
Regression (1) in Table 4 estimates the overall effect of capital controls. The 
estimation result suggests a positive effect of capital controls on monetary policy 
independence, although it is not statistically significant. The effects of control variables 
are reported at the bottom of the table. Maintaining a fixed exchange rate lowers 
monetary independence since monetary policy is constrained to keep the exchange rate 
fixed. Inflation also significantly reduces monetary independence. This is in line with 
previous studies that there is a negative correlation between inflation rate and indicators 
of central bank independence. Financial development slightly negatively affects monetary 
independence as expected. Relative income and trade openness tend to have little effect. 
The six control variables are consistently signed across 6 different specifications reported 
in Table 4. Among the variables that have statistically significant effects, a fixed 
exchange rate regime reduces monetary independence. This is consistent with the 
trilemma and also with Shambaugh (2004).  
  
Interestingly, monetary independence is negatively is associated with both trade 
openness and financial development. Regarding the latter, to the extent that capital 
mobility typically advances along liberalization and development in the financial sector, 
this result is consistent with the trilemma as well. The negative effect of trade openness 
on monetary independence seems reasonable given that greater trade openness is 
associated with a smaller economy that tends to be exposed to more shocks of the 
external origin. See McKinnon (1963) for an early discussion about the linkage.  
Regression (3) uses a disaggregate set of capital control variables including 
restrictions on equity  and collective investment flows, restrictions on bond and financial 
credit flows, and restrictions on direct investment flows. Different types of capital flow 
restrictions seem to have different effects on monetary independence. In particular, 
restrictions on equity and collective investment and those on direct investment flows 
seem to help improve a country’s monetary independence. Yet restrictions on bond and 
                                                            
4 Windmeijer (2005) aruges that the two-step efficient GMM, with small sample correction, performs better 
than one-step in estimating coefficients, with lower bias and standard errors. 
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financial credit flows would decrease a country’s monetary independence. This is an 
interesting result and requires further investigation.  
In the trilemma, the tradeoff between capital mobility and monetary independence 
may depend on the exchange rate regime, so regression (2) and (4) add the interaction 
terms between the exchange rate regime and capital controls to regression (1) and (3), 
respectively. The coefficient of the interaction term in regression (2) is positive and 
statistically significant. However, no interaction term is statistically significant in 
regression (4).  
Regression (5) employs a more detailed set of capital controls compared to 
regression (3). In this regression, we distinguish capital controls not only on their asset 
type but also on their type of flows – inflows or outflows. Results from regression (5) are 
quite similar to those of regression (3). All coefficients here have the same sign as before. 
An interesting finding is that the restrictions on inflows seem to be more effective than 
those on outflows. A joint test of insignificance of all capital controls on inflow is 
rejected at the 5 percent significance level, while a similar test on capital controls on 
outflow is not rejected. This is consistent with previous studies as summrized by Magud et 
al (2011): capital controls on inflows seem to make monetary policy more independent, yet 
controls on outflow are not as conclusive as those on inflows. Regression (6) adds interaction 
terms between capital controls and exchange rate regime based on specifications in 
regression (5). Results here are consistent with the other regressions: capital controls 
enhance monetary independence; the tradeoff between capital mobility and monetary 
independence depends on the exchange rate regime; restrictions on inflows are more 
effective than on outflows. 
Table 2.5 reports a selection of validity tests for system GMM estimation 
developed by Hansen (1982) and Arellano and Bond(1991). The three tests are standard 
post-estimation tests that are used to test the validity of instruments used in system GMM 
estimation. Test for AR(2) is the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation among 
idiosyncratic disturbance terms. Existence of autocorrelation invalidates some or all 
lagged values as instruments. The test for validity of moment conditions is the Hansen 
test of over-identification. System GMM can generate many moment conditions using 
lagged values as instruments, but it relies on the assumption that changes in the 
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instruments are uncorrelated with the individual fixed effects. This test thus tests the joint 
validity of these moment conditions. The test for exogeneity of instrument subsets is 
Difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity of instrument subsets. It tests for the exogeneity 
of instruments used in the regression. A rejection of any of these tests may weaken the 
reliability of system GMM estimation. Reported in Table 2.5 are P-values which confirm 
the validity of instruments and the reliability of system GMM estimation.   
Overall, results from Table 2.4 clearly suggest that capital controls enhance 
monetary independence. Moreover, the effectiveness of capital controls depends on the 
types of assets and the direction of flows they are imposed. Restrictions on equity, 
collective investment and direct investment seem to be more effective than restrictions on 
bonds and financial credit. Restrictions on inflows appear to be more effective than those 
on outflows. In addition, a fixed exchange rate regime has negative impact on monetary 
independence. Furthermore, the choice of exchange rate regime seems to have important 
bearings on the effectiveness of capital controls on monetary independence. 
2.6 Robustness check 
Table 2.6 provides regression results using LSDV estimation. This estimation is 
commonly used to control for country fixed effects. However, it does not provide direct 
treatment to endogeneity issues. The results show that restrictions on capital flows 
statistically significantly affect monetary independence. All coefficients of capital control 
variables and control variables have the same signs as those of the GMM estimates. 
Clearly, result from LSDV estimation is highly consistent with system GMM estimation. 
As an alternative measure of exchange rate regime, we consider the ERS (exchange 
rate stability) measure developed by Aizenman, Chinn, and Ito (2010) (ACI). It ranges 
from 0, the lowest exchange rate stability, to 1, the highest one and is based on annual 
standard deviations of the monthly exchange rate between the home country and the base 
country.5
                                                            
5 ERS is defined as follows: 𝐸𝑅𝑆 = 0.01
0.01+𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑣(∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑒𝑥𝑐ℎ−𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)
. Thus, greater exchange rate flexibility 
reduces the measure. With no exchange rate changes, ERS = 1. 
 Table 2.7 reports the results obtained from using system GMM estimation 
along with the ACI measure of de facto exchange rate stablility instead of the Klein and 
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Shambaugh (2008)’s binary exchange rate regime classification used in Table 2.5. All 
coefficients of capital control variables and control variables have the same signs as those 
reported in Table 2.4. Interestingly, the coefficients on interaction terms tend to be 
statistically significant. These results reinforce the conclusion from Table 4 that the 
choice of exchange regime seems to have important impact on the effectiveness of capital 
controls on monetary independence.  
As part of robustness check, we also investigate whether capital controls affect 
monetary independence in a non-linear fashion. In particular, squared terms of capital 
control variables are added to the basic model. The results (not reported) indicate that the 
non-linear terms are not significant in any specification, which suggests that the linearity 
assumption on the relation between capital control and monetary independence seems to 
be valid. 
2.7. Conclusion 
International monetary policy trilemma − the tradeoff among exchange rate 
stability, monetary independence, and unrestricted capital mobility − is an important 
constraint for policymakers in an open economy. This paper empirically investigates the 
validity of the proposition that, holding the degree of exchange rate stability constant, a 
decrease in capital mobility through an imposition of capital controls will enhance 
monetary independence. Using a panel dataset covering 88 countries for the 1995-2010 
period and system GMM estimation, this paper finds that 1) capital controls help improve 
a country’s monetary independence; 2) the effectiveness of capital controls depends on 
the types of assets and the direction of flows they are imposed. Restrictions on equity, 
collective investment, and direct investment seem to be more effective than restrictions 
on bonds and financial credit. In addition, restrictions on inflows appear more effective 
than on those on outflows; 3) the choice of exchange rate regime seems to have important 
impact on the effectiveness of capital controls on monetary independence. Pegged 
exchange rate systems reduce monetary independence as expected. The results are fairly 
robust to changes in model specification or estimation method.  
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Table 2.1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Description Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
mi Monetary independence 1382 0.387 0.220 0 0.967 
       
 
Capital controls 
    ka Overall capital controls 1274 0.356 0.348 0 1 
eqci equity+collective investment  1456 0.348 0.362 0 1 
bofc bond+financial credit  1274 0.349 0.362 0 1 
di direct investment 1456 0.402 0.402 0 1 
eqcii equity+collective investment inflow 1456 0.297 0.358 0 1 
eqcio equity+collective investment outflow 1456 0.399 0.411 0 1 
bofci bond+financial credit inflow 1274 0.291 0.367 0 1 
bofco bond+financial credit outflow 1274 0.408 0.417 0 1 
dii direct investment inflow 1456 0.434 0.495 0 1 
dio direct investment outflow 1456 0.315 0.464 0 1 
       
 
Control variables 
    peg exchange rate stability 1456 0.364 0.481 0 1 
pi inflation 1274 0.012 0.103 -0.610 0.569 
openc trade openness 1365 0.868 0.555 .132 4.534 
fin_dvp private credit/GDP 1414 0.637 0.534 0 3.194 
y relative income 1365 0.391 0.366 .0173 3.111 
Note: Equity refers to shares and other securities, such as stocks; bond refers to bond and other securities; 
collective investment includes share certificates and registry entries or other evidence of securities investor 
interest in an institution for collective investment, such as mutual funds; financial credits includes credits 
other than commercial credits granted by all residents, including banks, to nonresidents, or vice versa; 
direct investment refers to investments for the purpose of establishing lasting investment economic 
relations both abroad by residents and domestically by nonresidents. 
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Table 2.2. Correlation between capital controls on different assets 
  eqci bofc di 
eqci 1 
  bofc 0.877 1 
 di 0.745 0.698 1 
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Table 2.3. Correlation between capital controls on different types of assets and flows 
  eqcii eqcio bofci bofco dii dio 
eqcii 1 
     eqcio 0.773 1 
    bofci 0.766 0.720 1 
   bofco 0.694 0.854 0.700 1 
  dii 0.472 0.358 0.278 0.345 1 
 dio 0.605 0.727 0.653 0.700 0.280 1 
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Table 2.4. Dynamic panel-data system GMM estimation  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ka 0.126 0.0415     
 (0.116) (0.111)     
ka_peg  0.131*     
  (0.0745)     
eqci   0.191 0.249*   
   (0.122) (0.147)   
bofc   -0.114 -0.245*   
   (0.0964) (0.129)   
di   0.105** 0.0488   
   (0.0425) (0.0668)   
eqci_peg    -0.105   
    (0.166)   
bofc_peg    0.201   
    (0.178)   
di_peg    0.0778   
    (0.122)   
eqcii     0.0595 0.0383 
     (0.0972) (0.0884) 
eqcio     0.169* 0.170* 
     (0.0886) (0.0903) 
bofci     -0.0100 -0.0580 
     (0.0763) (0.0653) 
bofco     -0.121 -0.139* 
     (0.0922) (0.0751) 
dii     0.0920*** 0.0454 
     (0.0324) (0.0323) 
dio     0.00447 -0.0272 
     (0.0545) (0.0456) 
eqcii_peg      0.0724 
      (0.128) 
eqcio_peg      -0.106 
      (0.148) 
bofci_peg      0.105 
      (0.111) 
bofco_peg      0.163 
      (0.144) 
dii_peg      0.0845 
      (0.0729) 
dio_peg      -0.106 
      (0.131) 
y -0.0866 -0.101* -0.0537 -0.0828 -0.0673 -0.107** 
 (0.0572) (0.0533) (0.0416) (0.0562) (0.0589) (0.0510) 
pi -0.108** -0.134** -0.138*** -0.103 -0.127** -0.119** 
 (0.0500) (0.0566) (0.0484) (0.0619) (0.0560) (0.0591) 
peg -0.0888*** -0.117*** -0.0989*** -0.155** -0.0895*** -0.163*** 
 (0.0296) (0.0414) (0.0307) (0.0676) (0.0331) (0.0601) 
openc -0.0275 -0.0101 -0.00227 0.0180 0.00474 0.0138 
 (3.49) (3.89) (0.0314) (0.0334) (0.0255) (0.0307) 
fin_dvp -0.0731*** -0.0863*** -0.0892*** -0.0929** -0.0988** -0.0922** 
 (0.0251) (0.0299) (0.0292) (0.0391) (0.0397) (0.0383) 
Constant 0.504*** 0.526*** 0.455*** 0.494*** 0.460*** 0.512*** 
 (0.0563) (0.0571) (0.0516) (0.0466) (0.0521) (0.0393) 
Observations 1,070 1,070 985 985 985 985 
Number of nation 88 88 88 88 88 88 
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Table 2.5. Tests for validity of system GMM estimation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
A. Test for AR(2) 0.442 0.591 0.294 0.452 0.290 0.364 
B. Test for validity of   
   moment conditions 
0.182 0.216 0.245 0.281 0.270 0.523 
C. Test for 
exogeneity of  
instrument subsets 
0.329 0.106 0.488 0.589 0.752 0.960 
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Table 2.6. Panel regression with country fixed effects 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ka 0.0777** 0.0730**     
 (0.0339) (0.0360)     
ka_peg  0.0184     
  (0.0378)     
eqci   0.192*** 0.204***   
   (0.0542) (0.0566)   
bofc   -0.150*** -0.139***   
   (0.0430) (0.0483)   
di   0.0709** 0.0458   
   (0.0276) (0.0295)   
eqci_peg    -0.0747   
    (0.0901)   
bofc_peg    -0.0362   
    (0.0750)   
di_peg    0.108*   
    (0.0597)   
eqcii     0.102** 0.106** 
     (0.0399) (0.0448) 
eqcio     0.0836** 0.0859* 
     (0.0425) (0.0449) 
bofci     -0.0667* -0.0687* 
     (0.0366) (0.0413) 
bofco     -0.0677** -0.0607* 
     (0.0314) (0.0343) 
dii     0.0629*** 0.0484** 
     (0.0170) (0.0208) 
dio     -0.00510 -0.00387 
     (0.0257) (0.0266) 
eqcii_peg      -0.0151 
      (0.0719) 
eqcio_peg      0.00335 
      (0.0838) 
bofci_peg      0.00295 
      (0.0665) 
bofco_peg      -0.0122 
      (0.0694) 
dii_peg      0.0440 
      (0.0306) 
dio_peg      -0.0133 
      (0.0709) 
y 0.0191 0.0184 0.0149 0.0233 0.00801 0.00866 
 (0.0667) (0.0666) (0.0695) (0.0660) (0.0682) (0.0664) 
pi -0.0625 -0.0621 -0.0372 -0.0381 -0.0387 -0.0381 
 (0.0471) (0.0471) (0.0477) (0.0473) (0.0475) (0.0475) 
peg -0.0347** -0.0432* -0.0366** -0.0360 -0.0373** -0.0431 
 (0.0159) (0.0253) (0.0173) (0.0289) (0.0173) (0.0316) 
openc -0.0892*** -0.0892*** -0.0695** -0.0698** -0.0754** -0.0737** 
 (0.0317) (0.0317) (0.0326) (0.0326) (0.0329) (0.0330) 
fin_dvp -0.0407 -0.0406 -0.0505* -0.0547** -0.0700** -0.0683** 
 (0.0273) (0.0273) (0.0280) (0.0274) (0.0287) (0.0284) 
Constant 0.560*** 0.564*** 0.532*** 0.523*** 0.540*** 0.534*** 
 (0.0628) (0.0638) (0.0668) (0.0678) (0.0657) (0.0675) 
Observations 1,070 1,070 985 985 985 985 
Number of nation 88 88 88 88 88 88 
R-squared 0.459 0.459 0.488 0.490 0.492 0.493 
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Table 2.7. Dynamic panel system GMM estimation using ACI exchange rate stability 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ka 0.0249 0.158     
 (0.0601) (0.123)     
ka_ers  -0.00502     
  (0.162)     
eqci   0.245*** 0.283***   
   (0.0388) (0.0899)   
bofc   -0.228*** -0.389***   
   (0.0388) (0.0956)   
di   0.0926*** 0.0951**   
   (0.0180) (0.0415)   
eqci_ers    -0.348***   
    (0.100)   
bofc_ers    0.451***   
    (0.124)   
di_ers    0.0591   
    (0.0742)   
eqcii     0.0717 0.0922*** 
     (0.0462) (0.0258) 
eqcio     0.189*** 0.210*** 
     (0.0442) (0.0137) 
bofci     -0.0309 -0.127*** 
     (0.0331) (0.0210) 
bofco     -0.190*** -0.206*** 
     (0.0449) (0.0228) 
dii     0.0812*** 0.0245** 
     (0.0181) (0.0103) 
dio     -0.00908 0.0815*** 
     (0.0181) (0.00954) 
eqcii_ers      -0.141*** 
      (0.0318) 
eqcio_ers      -0.124*** 
      (0.0190) 
bofci_ers      0.239*** 
      (0.0303) 
bofco_ers      0.133*** 
      (0.0351) 
dii_ers      0.0875*** 
      (0.0183) 
dio_ers      -0.198*** 
      (0.00901) 
y -0.145*** -0.0857* -0.109*** -0.115*** -0.106*** -0.135*** 
 (0.0371) (0.0490) (0.0295) (0.0353) (0.0329) (0.0105) 
pi -0.0721** -0.0933* -0.0773*** -0.0756** -0.0820*** -0.0725*** 
 (0.0310) (0.0552) (0.0173) (0.0305) (0.0253) (0.0148) 
ers -0.113*** -0.128* -0.142*** -0.203*** -0.148*** -0.133*** 
 (0.0267) (0.0701) (0.0209) (0.0661) (0.0280) (0.0249) 
openc -0.00799 -0.0147 0.00756 0.0266 0.0240 0.00876 
 (0.0193) (0.0350) (0.0159) (0.0217) (0.0183) (0.00889) 
fin_dvp -0.0672*** -0.0941*** -0.0834*** -0.0945*** -0.0898*** -0.0759*** 
 (0.0189) (0.0247) (0.0148) (0.0223) (0.0204) (0.00804) 
Constant 0.569*** 0.541*** 0.539*** 0.577*** 0.530*** 0.556*** 
 (0.0332) (0.0568) (0.0184) (0.0349) (0.0302) (0.0127) 
Observations 1,070 1,070 985 985 985 985 
Number of nation 88 88 88 88 88 88 
Number of nation 88 88 88 88 88 88 
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Table 2.8. List of countries in the dataset 
Low income Middle income High income 
Bangladesh Angola Panama Australia 
Burkina Faso Argentina Paraguay Austria 
Cote d'Ivoire Bolivia Peru Bahrain 
Ghana Brazil Philippines Belgium 
India Bulgaria Romania Brunei Darussalam 
Kenya Chile Russia Canada 
Kyrgyz Republic China South Africa Cyprus 
Pakistan Costa Rica Sri Lanka Denmark 
Tanzania Czech Republic Swaziland Finland 
Togo Dominican Republic Thailand France 
Uganda Ecuador Tunisia Germany 
Uzbekistan Egypt Turkey Greece 
Yemen, Republic of El Salvador Uruguay Hong Kong 
Zambia Georgia Venezuela Iceland 
 
Guatemala  Ireland 
 
Hungary  Israel 
 
Indonesia  Italy 
 
Jamaica  Japan 
 
Kazakhstan  Korea 
 
Latvia  Kuwait 
 
Lebanon  Malta 
 
Malaysia  Netherlands 
 
Mauritius  New Zealand 
 
Mexico  Norway 
 
Moldova  Portugal 
 
Morocco  Qatar 
 
Nicaragua  Saudi Arabia 
 
Oman  Singapore 
 
  Slovenia 
 
  Spain 
 
  Sweden 
 
  Switzerland 
 
  United Arab Emirates 
 
  United Kingdom 
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Chapter Three 
Capital mobility and economic growth: the role of capital controls 
3.1. Introduction 
The recent global financial crisis (2007-2009) has generated a hot debate among 
economists on capital controls as an important means in policy makers’ toolkit. For 
example, the IMF changed its own viewpoint on capital controls slowly in the past 
decade. During the East Asian financial crisis 1997-1998, the IMF provides bailout to 
Asian countries conditional on a more open capital account of the receiving country, 
because it believes that free capital mobility should provide a robust economic growth. 
However, after recent global financial crisis, the IMF no longer promotes free capital 
account convertibility for most countries. Instead, the IMF suggests the use of capital 
control with caution, especially in the short run, because it realizes capital controls can 
limit the contagion of financial crisis from one country to another and then mitigate the 
large negative effects of financial crises on economic growth  (IMF, 2011). 
The IMF’s shift of its position on capital controls may lead to the following 
question: how can capital controls affect economic growth if there is any? Literature on 
either capital controls or economic growth is numerous, yet the impact of capital controls 
on economic growth is far from conclusive. One explanation may be due to ambiguous 
effects of capital controls on economic growth. As argued by Agenor (2003), allowing a 
high level of international capital flows improves domestic investment and growth by 
providing extra resources through international capital market. At the same time, Agenor 
(2003) also alerts that international capital flows can be misallocated to finance 
speculative or low-quality domestic investments, which cannot promote a long-run 
economic growth. In addition, to the country with high capital mobility, the pro-cyclical 
nature of capital flows makes it even worse when the financial crisis comes. Clearly, the 
lack of consistent theory linking capital controls and economic growth makes this 
question more empirical.  
Literature that investigates the relation between capital controls and economic 
growth can be categorized into two groups according to their measure of capital controls. 
One large strand of studies focuses on the role of de jure measure of capital controls. That 
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evaluates the effect of capital controls using government official restrictions on capital 
flow as a measure of capital controls. Results from this category tend to vary greatly 
depending on the data source of capital controls. Using the IMF’s annual report exchange 
arrangements exchange restrictions (AREAER), Alesina et al. (1994) find, for OECD 
countries, that capital controls have positive but insignificant effects on economic growth. 
Grilli and Milesi-Feretti (1995) obtains a similar result for developing countries. The 
problem of AREAER is that it only provides a coarse 0/1 measure of a country’s capital 
control status before 1996. The lack of variation in the data makes research hard to find 
robust results. In contrast, some studies find robust results using alternative measures. 
Using a more finely classified measure of capital mobility, Quinn (1997) shows that 
capital account liberalization has had positive effects on economic growth.6
Although few studies find direct impact of capital controls on economic growth, 
some studies do find indirect relation between the two. Eichengreen and Leblang (2003) 
find that capital controls serve to insulate economies from international crises and result 
in faster growth. Chanda (2005) finds that, for countries with relatively higher degrees of 
ethnic heterogeneity, the effects of capital controls on economic growth are particularly 
adverse whereas for countries with high degrees of homogeneity, capital controls actually 
have a net positive effect on economic growth. Satyanath and Berger (2007) report that 
capital controls negatively affect growth in authoritarian countries, while growth in 
democratic countries is insignificantly affected.  
 Using data 
from emerging markets, Bekaert et al. (2001) finds that stock market liberalization 
contributes to growth shortly after liberalization, but the impacts diminish in the long run. 
Quinn and Toyoda (2008), using intensity measures of capital and current account 
openness, find that capital account liberalization has a positive association with economic 
growth.  
One possible explanation about why these studies cannot find a direct effect is that 
the measure of capital controls is too coarse or too broad. IMF’s AREAER before 1995 
only supports information about whether a country uses capital controls or not. Quinn’s 
                                                            
6 The measure is ranging from 0-2 (0, 0.5, 1, 1.5, or 2), which is based on the severity of restrictions (existence of 
approval requirements and frequency of approval). 
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measure considers intensity of capital controls but has limited countries coverage and is 
subjective. Furthermore, neither measure considers sub-categories of capital controls. It is 
possible that direct investment is more likely to affect long-run economic growth than 
portfolio flows, so capital controls on direct investment may be more significant than on 
other types of flows. Therefore, a more detailed dataset considering intensity, types of 
capital controls, and large coverage of countries would be better to study the effect of 
capital controls on economic growth. 
Another strand of studies pays more attention to the de facto measure of capital 
control or the opposite -- capital mobility (financial integration). In this branch, capital 
mobility is often measured as capital flows or stocks as share of GDP. The logic behind 
this approach is that government official restrictions may not capture the true level of 
capital controls, to which the actual change in capital flows can be a better proxy. Taking 
this approach, empirical works by Kraay (1998), O’Donnell (2001), Reisen and Soto 
(2002), Edison, et al. (2002), and Schularick and Steger (2010) have found mixed impact 
of financial integration on economic growth. The advantage of this de facto measure of 
capital controls is that it provides more information regarding the real level of a country’s 
capital mobility. However, policymakers cannot directly alter the actual level of capital 
flows but can only influence it through de jure policies. To policy makers, how de jure 
measures can affect a country’s economic growth would be of more interest than de facto 
measures. 
Despite rich literature on both measures of capital controls, few studies consider the 
linkage between the two measures. A few studies such as Kraay (1998), O’Donnell 
(2001), Edison, et al. (2002), and Quinn and Toyoda (2008) either use de jure or de facto 
measure as an alternative to each other, but never consider possible interaction effect 
between the two. The de jure capital controls measure reflects the existence of restrictions 
on capital flows, while the de facto measure captures the realized capital flows. Countries 
with very different de jure policies may experience quite different international capital 
flows. For instance, capital flight from some Latin American countries such as Brazil in 
the 1970s and 1980s are examples of involuntary de facto financial integration in 
economies that are de jure closed to financial flows. On the other hand, some countries in 
Africa such as Uganda have few capital account restrictions but have experienced only 
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minimal levels of capital flows (Prasad, et al., 2007). As the two measures report two 
different aspects of a country’s capital mobility, the results obtained from either measure 
could be partial and even biased. The possibility that countries with high capital flows 
may impose capital control policies for economic performance purposes cannot be ruled 
out. Also, countries with few capital flows may not impose capital control policies 
because there is no need for regulation. It would be interesting to evaluate government 
official capital restrictions after controlling for the actual level of capital flows and the 
interaction effect between de jure capital controls and de facto capital flows on economic 
growth.  
Given the ambiguous results and limitations of previous studies, this paper tries to 
revisit the relation between capital controls and economic growth with new elements. 
First, to address drawbacks of de jure measures on capital controls used by past studies, 
this paper uses a novel dataset about restrictions on capital flows. According to economic 
theory, international capital flows may not promote economic growth if they are 
misallocated such as allocated to financial speculative areas. In other words, different 
types of capital flows – stocks, bonds, or direct investment – may yield different results 
to economic growth. This dataset uses disaggregated data on capital control such as 
controls on equity or on direct investment instead of a coarse 0/1 measure employed in 
most previous studies. With this disaggregated measure on different forms of capital 
controls, policy makers can discover more detailed relations between capital controls and 
economic growth. In addition, the data reflects the intensity of capital controls by 
construction.7
Second, this paper gives equal look at both de jure and de facto measures of capital 
controls in one empirical setup. The use of either de jure or de facto measure may provide 
a partial picture of capital mobility as discussed above. To better evaluate how official 
capital control policies work, de facto capital flows need to be controlled rather than 
referring them as alternatives to de jure policies. Also, capital control policies may have 
non-linear effects on economic growth depending on the actual level of capital flows. An 
 The data may capture the differences in capital controls across countries 
and provide a better estimation for the effect of capital controls. 
                                                            
7 See section 2 for more detailed discussion on data construction. 
33 
 
interaction between de jure policies and de facto flows needs to be considered jointly 
with their individual effects. 
With a novel dataset and a more careful treatment to de facto and de jure measures 
of capital controls, this paper finds that 1) capital control policies promote economic 
growth after taking into account a country’s de facto level of capital flows, while higher 
de facto capital flows is associated with higher growth rate and the positive effect of 
capital controls tends to be weakened as de facto level of capital flows increases. 2) 
Controls on capital inflows promote economic growth, while controls on outflows have 
little impact on growth. Again, de facto level of capital flows tends to weaken the 
positive effect of capital controls on inflows. 3) Restrictions on different asset types 
affect differently on growth. Capital controls on equity-type flows impede growth; 
controls on debt-type flows promote growth; controls on direct investment have positive 
but insignificant effects on growth.  
The paper is constructed as follows. Section 2 describes the dataset. Section 3 
illustrates the methodology. Section 4 reports the main results. Section 5 examines the 
robustness of the results. Section 6 concludes. 
3.2. Data  
 The most crucial part for examining the relation between capital controls and 
economic growth is to measure the existence and the intensity of capital controls. As de 
jure and de facto measures of capital controls measure two different aspects of a 
country’s capital control status, it is important to consider both simultaneously. This 
paper takes into account both de jure and de facto measures in a uniform setup.  
To measure the actual level of capital controls, this paper follows previous studies 
(i.e. Edison, et al., 2002), using the estimated stocks of foreign assets and liabilities as a 
share of GDP. The data source is from the IMF’s international financial statistics (IFS) 
for the period 1995-2009.  
To measure the intended level of capital flows of policy makers, a novel dataset is 
used. The methodology used for constructing the dataset is similar to that of Schindler 
(2009). The original data source is the IMF’s AREAER. Until 1995, AREAER reports 
each country’s overall capital controls status using the 0/1 dummy; beginning 1995, the 
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IMF breaks down the simple measure to several categories according to capital flows’ 
asset type, ownership, and direction of flows. Based on this new coding system, 
Schindler first codes the restrictiveness of controls at the level of individual transactions, 
and then takes average of these subindices to obtain more finely gradated asset- or 
inflow/outflow- specific indices.8
As a growth paper, the choice of growth variable and other control variables in this 
paper follows previous studies quite closely.
 The advantages of this dataset include 1) restrictions on 
capital controls can be identified according to flows’ asset type or direction of flows; 2) 
the intensity of capital control policies is also considered because of the coding method 
(see footnote 3). Schindler (2009)’s original paper covers the period from 1995 to 2005. 
This paper updates the data to 2010.  
9
The main dataset is a 3-year average panel dataset covering 78 countries – 
developed and developing – during 1995-2009. In growth literature, five-year averages 
have used as a standard method to minimize cyclicality of the data. In this study, due to 
 The growth rate of a country is calculated 
using real GDP per capita. The data source is Penn World Table (PWT) 7.0. Control 
variables include investment (investment to GDP ratio), inflation rate, schooling, life 
expectancy, initial income (initial per capital GDP), population growth rate, financial 
development (private credit to GDP ratio), trade openness (trade volume to GDP ratio), 
exchange rate regime, and domestic institution. The data source of investment, inflation 
rate, initial income, population growth rate, and trade openness is PWT 7.0. The source 
of schooling, life expectancy, and financial development is from World Bank’s world 
development indicators (WDI). Exchange rate regime is from Klein and Shambaugh 
(2008). The original paper only covers data up to 2006, so this paper updates the data to 
2010. 
                                                            
8 i.e. equity transactions are classified into four types: residents buying or selling assets abroad, and 
nonresidents selling or buying domestic assets. Each of these basic transactions is coded as 1 if restrictions 
exist and 0 otherwise. Thus, an aggregate equity controls index would be the average of four binary 
variables and could thus take on five different values: 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, or 1. The equity inflow and 
outflow indices, respectively, are the average of two underlying transaction variables, thus potentially 
assuming three values: 0, 0.5, or 1. The construction of these variables takes different values like 0, 0.25, 
0.5, 0.75, or 1, implicitly measuring the intensity of capital controls. 
9 See Levine and Renelt (1992) for more discussion on possible control variables. 
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the relatively short period of available data on capital controls, I only take three-year 
averages for more observations. Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics of the variables 
used in the paper. Capital control variables range from 0 to 1 by construction. The 
average 3-year overall capital controls is 0.35, which suggests a moderate level of de jure 
restrictions on capital flows worldwide. The average 3-year overall capital stock is 241% 
with a large standard deviation, a minimum of 6% (Russia 1995-1997) and a maximum 
of 3797% (Ireland 2007-2009). The worldwide average 3-year growth rate is 8% 
meaning a 2.7% annual growth rate.  
3.3. Methodology 
 The following regression equation is estimated to investigate the effectiveness of 
capital control policies on economic growth. 
Δyit = α + β CCDJit + λCCDJit ∗ CCDFit + δ CCDFit +  γ Xit +  ϵit       (1) 
where i and t denote country and year. yit is the natural log of a country’s GDP. 
Δyit measures a country’s growth rate. CCDJit is a vector of de jure capital control 
variables including restrictions on capital inflows and outflows and restrictions across 
different asset categories. CCDFit is a vector of de facto capital control variables 
including realized capital stocks to GDP ratio across different asset type and direction of 
flows. In some regressions, an aggregate capital control variable of de jure and de facto is 
used instead. Including both measures in a single equation can help identify the true 
effects of government capital control policies on economic growth after controlling for 
the actual level of capital flows. Xit is a group of control variables which are potential 
determinants of economic growth, including investment as a share of GDP, inflation rate, 
schooling, life expectancy, initial income, population growth rate, financial development, 
trade openness, and exchange rate regime. Most of these variables are commonly used in 
growth literature. In this model, I also include financial development, trade openness, and 
exchange rate regime, as these variables are closely linked to capital flows and capital 
account convertibility.  
To estimate Eq. (1), dynamic panel data system generalized method of moments 
(GMM) estimation is used. The estimation is pioneered by Arellano-Bond (1991) and 
Arellano-Bover (1995)/Blundell-Bond (1998).  
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The system GMM estimation is developed to address a general model as follows: 
yit −  yit−1 = (α − 1)yit−1 + βxit + ϵit 
ϵit =  µi + υit  
E(µit) =  E(υit) = E(µitυit) = 0 
where the disturbance term has two orthogonal components: the fixed effects, µi, and the 
idiosyncratic shocks, υit. 
System GMM is popularly used in growth literature because of its advantages over 
other estimations such as OLS. First, the estimation addresses omitted variable bias by 
construction: system GMM uses data transformations such as first-difference or 
“orthogonal deviations”10
3.4. Results 
 for each individual to remove individual fixed effect. For 
instance, using first-difference, Δyit =  (α − 1)yit−1 + βΔxit + υit. The individual fixed 
effect, µi, is removed from the model. Second, if some explanatory variables may be 
endogenous, lagged values of the variables are used as instruments. In this way, potential 
endogeneity problems can be mitigated. Third, growth rate of a country has been proved 
to be dependent on initial income, and system GMM allows the dynamic of dependent 
variable – growth rate. Fourth, it avoids Hurwicz bias which would bias the estimator 
downward when the time dimension of the panel is short in a dynamic model. Moreover, 
Windmeijer (2005) develops a small-sample correction to improve the accuracy of 
standard errors provided by the estimation, which makes the estimation more practical. 
Overall, system GMM estimation provides less biased results than conventional 
estimation methods such as pooled OLS or fixed effect panel regression. 
3.4.1 Preliminary analysis 
Figure 3.1 provides an overview of world capital market. The dashed line shows 
the de facto average capital stocks of each country. World capital stocks as a share of 
GDP are doubled from 1995 to 2009, reflecting a fast past pace of the financial 
globalization. The global financial crisis of 2007-2009 did decrease the capital flows, but 
they recovered quickly. Solid line shows the average government restrictions on capital 
                                                            
10 See Arellano-Bover (1995) for a full discussion. 
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flows. The restriction is ranged from 0 to 1 (highest restriction) for every country. Before 
the recent global financial crisis, the overall tendency is removing capital controls. 
However, during crisis, many countries reversed their capital account liberalization 
process in order to insulate themselves from spillovers of the crisis. 
Table 3.2 reports some basic correlation tests between capital control policies and 
actual capital flows. From the table, correlations within different capital flows or within 
different capital control policies are usually high in the same direction. However, capital 
flows and restrictions on capital flows have a low correlation. Capital controls seem to 
run the course of limiting capital flows in general. This result provides support for the 
idea that the two different measures measure different aspects of a country’s capital 
mobility. This result suggests that de jure and de facto measures could be considered 
independently rather than alternatively. 
Table 3.3 shows how de jure capital control policies may affect de facto level of 
capital flows. The 20% percentile overall capital controls, ka, has a value of 0; 20% to 80% 
percentile ka ranges from 0 to 0.77; 80% and above percentile ka ranges from .77 to 1. In 
general, means of capital flows are decreasing in ka -- the heavier the restrictions on 
capital flows are, the lower the actual capital flows are. De jure capital controls seem to 
achieve its initial goal of controlling capital flows.   
3.4.2 Main results 
Table 3.4 contains a panel of four regressions with different specifications on 
capital flows and capital controls.11
                                                            
11 Control variables are included but not reported in each regression in table 4-6 in order to save space. 
 Regression 1 evaluates the effect of capital controls 
on growth in general. Overall, capital control policies would help improve a country’s 
economic growth rate and they serve well a filter to prevent undesired international 
capital flows. While a higher level of capital mobility measured as capital stocks to GDP 
ratio will also increase growth rate. This result suggests that financial integration is good 
for economic growth. In addition, greater financial integration would decrease the 
positive effect of capital control policies. This can be explained by international monetary 
policy trilemma. Holding exchange rate system as fixed, countries with higher capital 
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mobility are less capable of implementing monetary policy and achieving 
macroeconomic goals in the economy. But in total, the effect of de jure controls 
dominates that of de facto controls in magnitude. This implies that financial integration is 
good for economic growth but needs to be managed and regulated well with de jure 
policies. 
Regression 2 distinguishes capital flows in terms of direction of flows. The overall 
capital control measure is replaced by controls on inflow and outflow. Similarly, the 
overall capital stock is split to capital inflows and outflows. The results show that capital 
controls on inflow increase growth rate maybe due to the fact that controls on inflow are 
used to absorb desired capital inflows and prevent undesired inflows. Yet controls on 
outflow have limited effect on economic growth. An explanation is that controls on 
inflows are often precautious policies and would be regulated well, while controls on 
outflows are often last-minute policies in desire to rescue the economy already in deep 
recession and are not well regulated. A high level of capital inflows also promotes 
economic growth as more economic resources are available from international capital 
market for domestic development. Similarly, a high level of capital outflows reduces 
growth as less external resources are available for home market. The positive effect of 
controls on capital inflow decreases in the level of capital inflows, which again can be 
explained by the international monetary policy trilemma.  
 Regression 3 distinguishes capital controls and flows in terms of asset type 
including the most important ones – equity, debt, and direct investment. The results show 
that restrictions on equity type flows decrease growth, which is consistent with the 
finding that stock market liberalization promote economic growth (Bekaert et al. 2001). 
In contrast, restrictions on debt increase the growth rate. Restrictions on direct investment 
increase growth rate but not significantly. Capital flows and interaction terms no longer 
significantly affect economic growth after breaking down to different asset type. 
However, F-test rejects the null of no effect of those three types of capital flows on 
growth as a whole.  
Regression 4 distinguishes capital controls and flows in terms of both asset type 
and direction of flows. This specification does not show any significant results which 
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may due to some potential multicollinearity problems. However, the signs of variables 
tend to be consistent with other regressions. 
In sum, some interesting results have been found in this panel of regressions. First, 
de facto and de jure measures of capital controls measure two different aspects of a 
country’s level of capital mobility or financial integration, which may explain why the 
effects of these two measures of capital controls on growth seem different from previous 
studies. The results show that both more capital control polices and a higher level of 
capital flows help a country’s economic growth. This suggests financial integration 
promotes economic growth, but it needs to be managed by de jure policies, which serve 
as a filter to international capital flows. Second, capital controls on different types of 
flows may affect growth differently. Controls on inflows increase growth rate, yet 
controls on outflows have little impact on growth. Controls on debt and direct investment 
flows help the economy more than those on equity flows.  
3.5. Robustness check 
Although using multiple-year average data has been a standard in growth literature, 
it is still interesting to see the results using annual data without any averaging because it 
can capture the capital control policies that are subject to change more frequently. Table 
3.5 reports results from annual data using identical system GMM estimation and 
specifications as does Table 3.4. These results are consistent with what I have obtained 
using 3-year average data in terms of coefficient signs, although some may not be as 
significant as table 3. The lack of significance may be due to the effect of business cycles, 
which shadows the effect of capital controls. Overall, Table 3.5 serves well for robustness 
check purpose. 
Cross-sectional regression is suitable for permanent growth effects such as 
education in general; however, when facing the effect of capital controls, cross-sectional 
regression is no longer appropriate. As argued by Henry (2007), the effect of capital 
account liberalization on growth is more like a short-run (less than 5 years) rather than a 
long-run effect. But for the purpose of robustness check, it is worth comparing the panel 
results with cross-sectional results. Table 3.6 reports pure cross-sectional results during 
1995-2009. To address endogeneity issues, all explanatory variables are calculated using 
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data from the first half (1995-2001) of the whole period. The results are in line with the 
main findings of this paper as most coefficients have the same signs.  
3.6. Conclusion 
The role of capital controls or capital mobility on growth has been debated for a 
long time, yet the empirical evidence is still far from conclusive.  
This paper revisits this long-lasting topic using a novel dataset and a new empirical 
framework. First, following Schindler (2009), we construct the de jure measure of capital 
controls according to the asset types and directions of capital flows. In addition, the data 
considers the intensity of capital controls by construction. With the new dataset, more 
detailed results can be found. Second, as de jure and de facto measures of capital controls 
report two different aspects of a country’s level of capital mobility, the results obtained 
from using either measure only could be partial and even biased. Therefore, this study 
considers both measures simultaneously. With this improved setup, some interesting 
results merge. 
They can be summarized as follows: 1) capital control policies promote economic 
growth after taking into account a country’s de facto level of capital flows. At the same 
time, greater de facto capital flows are associated with higher growth rate. And the 
effectiveness of capital control policies seems to be weakened as a country involves in 
the international capital market more deeply. 2) Controls on capital inflows do help a 
country’s economic growth, while controls on outflows have less impact on growth. 
Again, a high level of de facto capital flows weakens the positive effect of capital 
controls on inflows. Restrictions on different asset types of capital flows affect growth 
differently. Capital controls on debt flows and direct investment seem to be more 
effective than those on equity flows.  
Indeed, from the results in this paper, overall financial integration promotes 
economic growth, but de jure capital control policies are also necessary and even more 
important for a country to absorb the desired capital flows from international capital 
flows and prevent undesired capital flows which may in turn impede economic growth. It 
is ideal for a country to abstract more international capital flows in a managed and 
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regulated way. In addition, instead of looking for a one-size-fit-all policy, policymakers 
should be more discretionary when interacting with international financial market. 
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Figure 3.1. World capital mobility 1995-2009 
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Table 3.1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Description Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variable 
     growth growth rate 364 0.081 0.082 -0.160 0.495 
      De jure capital controls 
     ka Overall control 455 0.352 0.344 0.000 1.000 
kai inflow control 455 0.321 0.327 0.000 1.000 
kao outflow control 455 0.383 0.389 0.000 1.000 
eq equity control 455 0.358 0.368 0.000 1.000 
debt debt control 455 0.333 0.387 0.000 1.000 
di direct invest control 455 0.393 0.388 0.000 1.000 
eqi equity inflow control 455 0.319 0.375 0.000 1.000 
debti debt inflow control 455 0.275 0.386 0.000 1.000 
dii di inflow control 455 0.472 0.468 0.000 1.000 
eqo equity outflow control 455 0.397 0.420 0.000 1.000 
debto debt outflow control 455 0.392 0.427 0.000 1.000 
dio di outflow control 455 0.314 0.447 0.000 1.000 
      De facto capital controls (all flows here mean capital stocks) 
flowg gross flow to GDP 345 2.414 4.011 0.059 37.974 
inflowg inflow to GDP 345 1.263 1.959 0.026 19.427 
outflowg outflow to GDP 345 1.150 2.081 0.020 18.546 
flowg_di di flow to GDP 350 0.456 0.738 0.000 6.634 
flowg_eq equity flow to GDP 346 0.297 0.806 -0.000 9.253 
flowg_debt debt flow to GDP 346 0.445 0.974 0.000 11.675 
inflowg_di di inflow to GDP 350 0.268 0.378 0.000 3.512 
inflowg_eq equity inflow to GDP 349 0.157 0.505 -0.000 6.161 
inflowg_debt debt inflow to GDP 349 0.217 0.449 0.000 4.453 
outflowg_di di outflow to GDP 350 0.188 0.382 -0.007 3.122 
outflowg_eq equity outflow to GDP 346 0.138 0.321 0.000 3.092 
outflowg_debt debt outflow to GDP 346 0.226 0.607 0.000 7.222 
      Control variables 
     ki investment to GDP (%) 455 23.094 7.311 5.324 48.538 
peg exchange rate regime 455 0.368 0.445 0.000 1.000 
openk trade openness (%) 455 85.018 54.966 17.237 429.911 
fin_dvp financial development (%) 448 62.762 52.156 2.714 257.285 
inflation inflation rate (%) 433 14.814 115.135 -2.405 2345.359 
life_exp life expectancy 455 71.128 8.798 41.706 82.675 
sec_sch_gro 2nd school enrollment (%) 414 82.224 28.132 5.366 158.453 
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Table 3.2. correlation between capital control policies and actual capital flows 
 
ka flowg 
ka 1 
 flowg -0.2481 1 
 
kai kao inflowg outflowg 
kai 1 
   kao 0.8563 1 
  inflowg -0.2121 -0.2485 1 
 outflowg -0.2303 -0.2516 0.9708 1 
 
eq mm di flowg_eq flowg_debt flowg_di 
eq 1 
     mm 0.8544 1 
    di 0.7813 0.7495 1 
   flowg_eq -0.2071 -0.2095 -0.1413 1 
  flowg_debt -0.2196 -0.2375 -0.1219 0.8906 1 
 flowg_di -0.2178 -0.2368 -0.1828 0.6041 0.5168 1 
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Table 3.3. Mean of capital flows by de jure overall capital controls ka 
ka percentile 20% and below 20% to 80% 80% and above 
value of ka 0 0 to 0.77 0.77 to 1 
 mean 
flowg 2.893 2.765 0.687 
flowg_eq 0.401 0.341 0.027 
flowg_debt 0.474 0.560 0.041 
flowg_di 0.644 0.474 0.164 
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Table 3.4. 3-year average system GMM estimation during 1995-2009 
Dependent variable: growth rate  
Regression  1 
 
 2 
 
 3 
 
 4 
capital controls coefficient capital controls coefficient capital controls coefficient capital controls coefficient 
ka 0.0711* kai 0.148* eq -0.0974** eqi -0.032 
 (0.0421)  (0.0765)  (0.0474)  (0.0517) 
ka×flowg -0.0254** kao -0.0526 debt 0.0926** debti 0.0586 
 (0.0121)  (0.0579)  (0.0431)  (0.0487) 
flowg 0.00964* kai×inflowg -0.0952** di 0.0192 dii 0.0149 
 (0.00509)  (0.0381)  (0.0427)  (0.0316) 
  
kao×outflowg 0.0257 eq×flowg -0.02 eqi×inflowg -0.389 
  
 (0.0167)  (0.091)  (0.244) 
  
inflowg 0.0620** debt×flowg -0.0732 debti×inflowg -0.127 
  
 (0.0252)  (0.0525)  (0.159) 
  
outflowg -0.0438** di×flowg 0.0305 dii×inflowg -0.0913 
  
 (0.0193)  (0.056)  (0.0694) 
    
flowg_di -0.00981 inflowg_di 0.181 
    
 (0.0338)  (0.125) 
    
flowg_eq -0.0238 inflowg_eq 0.0477 
    
 (0.0272)  (0.0574) 
    
flowg_debt 0.0254 inflowg_debt 0.0581 
    
 (0.0239)  (0.0596) 
      
eqo -0.0264 
      
 (0.0417) 
      
debto 0.0112 
      
 (0.048) 
      
dio 0.0195 
      
 (0.0622) 
      
eqo×outflowg 0.238 
      
 (0.318) 
      
debto×outflowg -0.059 
      
 (0.11) 
      
dio×outflowg 0.0984 
      
 (0.221) 
      
outflowg_di -0.0581 
      
 (0.0742) 
      
outflowg_eq -0.104 
      
 (0.155) 
      
outflowg_debt -0.0304 
      
 (0.0349) 
Observations 281 
 
281 
 
278 
 
278 
countries 78   78   78   78 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Control variables are included but not reported in each regression. 
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Table 3.5. Annual data system GMM estimation during 1995-2009 
Dependent variable: growth rate  
Regression  1 
 
 2 
 
 3 
 
 4 
capital controls coefficient capital controls coefficient capital controls coefficient capital controls coefficient 
ka 0.0296 kai 0.0366 eq -0.0138 eqi -0.0335* 
 (0.0266)  (0.0258)  (0.0209)  (0.02) 
ka×flowg -0.00627 kao 0.00559 debt 0.0298* debti 0.0398 
 (0.00454)  (0.0188)  (0.0168)  (0.024) 
flowg 0.00527** kai×inflowg -0.0218* di 0.014 dii -0.0117 
 (0.00262)  (0.0129)  (0.0156)  (0.0127) 
  
kao×outflowg 0.00125 eq×flowg 0.021 eqi×inflowg 0.0651 
  
 (0.00875)  (0.0389)  (0.212) 
  
inflowg 0.000734 debt×flowg -0.015 debti×inflowg -0.161 
  
 (0.00698)  (0.0185)  (0.211) 
  
outflowg 0.00859 di×flowg -0.00459 dii×inflowg 0.0321 
  
 (0.0066)  (0.0184)  (0.0267) 
    
flowg_di -0.00124 inflowg_di -0.0235 
    
 (0.0105)  (0.0442) 
    
flowg_eq 0.00301 inflowg_eq 0.0222 
    
 (0.00841)  (0.0452) 
    
flowg_debt 0.000195 inflowg_debt -0.0133 
    
 (0.00793)  (0.0147) 
      
eqo 0.00541 
      
 (0.0215) 
      
debto 0.0258 
      
 (0.0223) 
      
dio -0.00407 
      
 (0.0164) 
      
eqo×outflowg -0.0117 
      
 (0.108) 
      
debto×outflowg -0.0926* 
      
 (0.0532) 
      
dio×outflowg 0.105 
      
 (0.119) 
      
outflowg_di 0.000916 
      
 (0.0507) 
      
outflowg_eq 0.0106 
      
 (0.0362) 
      
outflowg_debt -0.00567 
      
 (0.0239) 
Observations 791 
 
791 
 
788 
 
788 
countries 78   78   77   77 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Control variables are included but not reported in each regression. 
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Table 3.6. Cross-country OLS estimation during 1995-2009 
Dependent variable: growth rate  
Regression  1 
 
 2 
 
 3 
 
 4 
capital controls coefficient capital controls coefficient capital controls coefficient capital controls coefficient 
ka 5.525 kai 6.145 eq -11.75 eqi 4.418 
 (11.23)  (18.48)  (14.66)  (14.25) 
ka×flowg -7.549*** kao -0.173 debt 23.16** debti 25.57 
 (2.692)  (12.71)  (11.45)  (15.77) 
flowg 1.284** kai×inflowg -3.802 di -7.834 dii -2.934 
 (0.558)  (13.08)  (8.931)  (7.305) 
  
kao×outflowg -12.27 eq×flowg -50.43 eqi×inflowg -122.5 
  
 (19.06)  (76.87)  (142.4) 
  
inflowg -0.834 debt×flowg -48.91 debti×inflowg -112.3 
  
 (7.153)  (34.93)  (122.6) 
  
outflowg 2.988 di×flowg 23.08 dii×inflowg 5.601 
  
 (6.633)  (33.48)  (36.02) 
    
flowg_di 4.322 inflowg_di 12.15 
    
 (5.015)  (21.34) 
    
flowg_eq -2.208 inflowg_eq 16.81 
    
 (7.768)  (11.59) 
    
flowg_debt 5.178 inflowg_debt -1.229 
    
 (8.264)  (25.66) 
      
eqo -19.38 
      
 (15.01) 
      
debto 5.391 
      
 (13.45) 
      
dio -0.25 
      
 (12.51) 
      
eqo×outflowg 54.59 
      
 (179.8) 
      
debto×outflowg -33.81 
      
 (32.26) 
      
dio×outflowg -49.87 
      
 (139.7) 
      
outflowg_di 2.969 
      
 (28.53) 
      
outflowg_eq -50.06 
      
 (38.26) 
      
outflowg_debt 6.777 
      
 (19.87) 
countries 68 
 
68 
 
68 
 
68 
R-squared 0.398   0.398   0.414   0.465 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Control variables are included but not reported in each regression. To 
address endogeneity issues, all explanatory variables are calculated using data from 1995-2001. 
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Chapter Four 
Exchange Rate Flexibility and Current Account Adjustment: A Threshold VAR Analysis 
4.1. Introduction 
The role of exchange rate flexibility in current account (CA) adjustment is a 
perennial issue in international finance. The founders of the Bretton Woods system 
believed that maintaining the fixed exchange rate system worldwide would bring 
prosperity to the world economy. This system could insure the stability of cross-country 
economic activities. Friedman (1953) argued against this opinion. He believed that 
exchange rate was the result not the cause of economic imbalances. A market-driven 
change in exchange rate is the consequence of economic balancing between countries; a 
flexible exchange rate system, in fact, would make corrections to potential economic 
imbalances, especially external imbalances such as CA balances, by allowing the 
exchange rate to be determined by market. Unlike Friedman’s direct argument on 
exchange rate flexibility and CA balances, most theoretic models including Mundell 
(1962), Dornbusch (1980), and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) focus on the relation between 
real exchange rate (RER) and CA balances. In all of these models, CA adjustment is 
following the movement of RER, regardless of whether the nominal exchange rate 
regime is fixed or flexible. In particular, RER adjustment will occur in response to a CA 
imbalance either via money-supply and price-level movements under a fixed exchange 
rate system or via movements in nominal exchange rate under floating exchange rate 
system. The point is due to sticky price and wages, the movements in price level is very 
slow and costly while the change in exchange rate seems less costly. This implies the 
hypothesis that flexible exchange rate facilitates CA adjustment. Despite the hypothesis 
implied by theory, there had been few empirical studies for many years until recently. 
Thanks to the hot discussion regarding global imbalances, empirical studies regarding 
exchange rate flexibility and CA adjustment have emerged. 
The global imbalances, some countries with huge CA deficits mapped by other 
countries’ large CA surplus, has attracted economists’ attention. In recent years, 
discussions are focusing on the sustainability of the CA imbalances given that the global 
imbalance is so large and persistent. In particular, two issues seem to be important. First, 
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how fast are imbalances in the CA adjusted? To the first question, Taylor (2002) 
responds that the every country will show CA balancing (stationary CA) at least in very 
long term (a century long period). However, the CA is non-necessarily mean-reversion in 
one or two decades. Given the potential long mean-reversion time, the second question 
tends to be really important – does greater exchange rate flexibility promote the 
adjustment in the CA? As argued by Friedman and implied by theory regarding RER and 
CA balances, the answer to this question seems to be yes. Many policy makers take this 
as a must-do suggestion to facilitate CA adjustment, but Chinn and Wei (2013) call this 
as a faith-based initiative without empirical support.  
As probably the first paper to empirically and systematically examine the relation 
between exchange rate flexibility and CA adjustment, Chinn and Wei (2013)’s paper uses 
panel regression and some commonly used exchange rate regime classifications to argue 
that exchange rate flexibility does not make clear contribution to CA adjustment. The 
authors use Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) 
classifications to capture exchange rate flexibility. Based on different exchange rate 
regimes, they divide the full sample (170 countries over 1971-2005) into different 
subsamples and estimate a first-order autoregression model in each subsample. By 
comparing the estimated first-order autoregressive coefficients across different exchange 
rate regime subsamples, they find no clear evidence that CA adjustment is faster under 
more flexible exchange rate regimes than under less flexible regimes. They also create a 
dummy for each exchange rate regime as an alternative to splitting the full sample. By 
comparing the coefficients among interactions between these dummies and lagged value 
of CA balances, they confirm their main findings. In addition, their results are not altered 
by adding more control variables, adding squared terms of CA to address non-linearity, 
or using two-stage regression to address endogeneity of exchange rate regimes. Similar to 
Chinn and Wei, Kim (1991) find little influence of exchange rate flexibility on trade 
balance (main component of CA balance) adjustment using the US data. Also, Decressin 
and Stavrev (2009) do not find a strong link between CA dynamics and RER rigidity 
across the European Economic and Monetary Union countries.   
Despite the systematic study from Chinn and Wei, some studies such as Herrmann 
(2009) and Ghosh et al. (2013) reject Chinn and Wei’s conclusion by arguing their 
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inappropriate use of exchange rate regime classifications. Instead, they construct their 
own classification on exchange rate flexibility and find that flexible exchange rate 
substantially facilitates CA adjustment. 
Another related strand of literature on CA adjustment examines the effect of 
exchange rate regimes on the probability of incurring CA reversals. Milesi-Ferreti and 
Razin (2000), Adalet and Eichengreen (2007), De Haan et al. (2008), Pancaro and 
Rueffer (2009), and Mu and He (2013) in general find that flexible exchange rate regime 
tends to increase the probability of CA reversal, although results from some studies are 
not statistically significant.  
The presumption of any similar study on exchange rate flexibility is that a 
country’s exchange rate regime captures its exchange rate flexibility. Exchange rate 
regime classification is not a trivial but in fact a really difficult task. The IMF’s 
conventional de jure classification is known for its inconsistency with countries’ de facto 
exchange rate regimes.12 To capture a country’s true exchange rate regime, Levy-Yeyati 
and Sturzenegger (2003), Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), and Klein and Shambaugh (2008) 
developed their own de facto classifications (more detailed discussion in section 2). 
However, from the results of this paper in section 2, we find that some existing widely 
used exchange rate regimes may not capture exchange rate flexibility as well as 
expectation. Therefore, some studies relying on the above classifications such as Chinn 
and Wei (2013)’s paper needs close scrutiny.13
Does exchange rate flexibility really matter for CA adjustment? In this paper, we 
reconsider the question and extend empirical analysis in at least three dimensions. First, 
our study uses a large panel dataset containing a long time series (up to 2010) as well as a 
large country group (90 countries). Second, we measure exchange rate variability using 
the actual market effective exchange rates instead of bilateral rates against the base 
country or using existing popular exchange rate regime classifications. Third, we employ 
  
                                                            
12 i.e. Philippines announced float in late 1980s, but were “soft peg” in the following 1990s until financial crisis in the 
late 1990s. Similar experience applies for many other Southeast Asian countries. 
13 Interestingly, we find that even in Chinn and Wei’s paper, exchange rate regime with the lowest exchange rate 
flexibility (based on the constructed variables in this paper) does exhibit most current account persistency.  
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a threshold VAR model and classify exchange rate regimes based on actual exchange rate 
movements.  
We find that first, the speed of CA adjustment is higher in a regime with greater 
exchange rate variability. This result is consistent with Friedman’s hypothesis. Second, 
using our own constructed exchange rate variability variables, we find that some existing 
exchange rate classifications may not capture actual exchange rate variability as well as 
expected. The unconventional result from Chinn and Wei (2013) is probably due to the 
inability of capturing exchange rate variability by some regime classifications for certain 
exchange rate regimes.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 checks the relation 
between exchange rate regime and exchange rate variability. Section 3 exhibits the 
Threshold VAR estimation of exchange rate variability and CA adjustment. Section 4 
describes the data used in the paper. Section 5 reports the estimation results. Section 6 
show results from some existing exchange rate regime classifications. Section 7 
concludes. 
4.2. Exchange rate regime classifications and exchange rate flexibility 
An exchange rate regime, by definition, reflects how the exchange rate authority 
manages its currency in relation to other currencies and the foreign exchange market. 
Regime classification is no easy task. As Klein and Shambaugh (2010) noted in their 
book, “Exchange rates are precisely measured. Exchange rate regimes are not.” The IMF 
first developed its exchange rate regime classification (covering 1970-1999) which was 
based on countries’ official notifications to the Fund. The de jure classification 
distinguished between three broad categories—pegged regimes, regimes with limited 
flexibility (usually within a band or cooperative arrangement), and more flexible 
arrangements (those with managed or free floats)—which were divided into 15 
subcategories.14
                                                            
14 The classification consists of three large categories including hard pegs, soft pegs, and floating 
arrangement. Hard pegs includes no separate legal tender and currency board; soft pegs includes 
conventional pegged arrangement, stabilized arrangement, pegged exchange rate within horizontal bands, 
crawling peg, and crawl-like arrangement; floating arrangement includes floating and free floating. 
 One main problem with this de jure classification is that there are wide 
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differences and inconsistencies between government declaration and actual exchange rate 
variation. For instance, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) show that few countries committed to 
their pegged system to extended periods of time. (They call this phenomenon “the mirage 
of fixed exchange rate.”) In contrast, Calvo and Reinhart (2002) find “fear of floating” – 
that is, most countries that claim a floating system do extensively intervene in the foreign 
exchange rate market to stabilize the exchange rate. In response to the inconsistency 
between the actual and declared classifications, IMF stopped publishing de jure 
classification in 1999 and has started to publish a de facto classification since 1998 with 
similar 15 subcategories. But this de facto classification is relatively short in time horizon 
and is subject to revision.15
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) (LY-S hereafter), Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) 
(R-R hereafter), and Klein and Shambaugh (2008) (K-S hereafter) respectively coded 
their own de facto exchange rate regime classification based on actual data. LY-S 
classification is based on cluster analysis using data on the mean of absolute monthly 
percentage change in the bilateral exchange rate in a calendar year (σe), the standard 
deviation of monthly percentage changes in the exchange rate (σ∆e), and the percentage 
change in net reserves relative to money supply (σr).
  
16
                                                            
15 Since 2009, to allow for greater consistency and objectivity of classifications across countries, the IMF 
has started to revise its classification. See Habermeier et al. (2009) for detailed revision. 
 In addition to exchange rate itself, 
the LY-S scheme captures the change in countries’ net reserves in order to identify 
whether and to what extent the exchange rate authority intervened in the foreign 
exchange market. However, the combination of information on reverses and exchange 
rate flexibility may result in misleading conclusion about a country’s exchange rate 
flexibility. For instance, while Hong Kong is well known for its currency board with the 
16 The classification provides a 5-way and a 3-way classification. 5-way consists of 1 = inconclusive, 2 = float, 3 = 
dirty, 4 = dirty/crawling peg, and 5 = fix. 3-way consists of 1 = float, 2 = intermediate, and 3 = fix. The cluster analysis 
is based on the following table:  
  σe σ∆e σr 
Inconclusive Low Low Low 
Flexible High High Low 
Dirty float High High High 
Crawling peg High Low High 
Fixed Low Low High 
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HK dollar pegged to the US dollar, the LY-S scheme classifies Hong Kong as 
inconclusive regime. Thus, while the LY-S scheme may be useful for research on 
government intervention in the foreign exchange market, it may incorrectly capture a 
country’s exchange rate policy.  
The R-R classification codes exchange rate regimes heavily based on the parallel, 
market-determined exchange rates of a country instead of official rate.17
The K-S classification takes a more straightforward and less data-demanding 
method. It mainly relies on the official exchange rate and codes a country as either 
pegged or non-pegged. In particular, the authors consider a country as having a fixed 
exchange rate in a given calendar year, with its currency pegged to the currency of a base 
country, if its month-end official bilateral exchange rate stays within a ± 2 % band both 
each month and over the course of that year. This classification does a very good job in 
capturing conventional fixers/pegs, but it also has some limitations. It is a 0/1 dummy 
variable by construction, which cannot distinguish intermediate and floating regimes and 
therefore captures less information about a country’s exchange rate flexibility. 
 The authors 
argue that this is more economically meaningful to a country’s international economic 
activities. Unlike other exchange rate regime classifications, the R-R coding is based on a 
five-year rolling window. It first calculates the mean of nominal exchange rate in the 5-
year window, then evaluates month by month whether the exchange rate is within certain 
bands of the mean, and finally calculates the probabilities that the exchange rate remains 
in each band over any given period such as a 5-year rolling window. This 5-year window 
however may potentially smooth the exchange rate flexibility and thus fail to capture the 
short-term dynamics of exchange rates, which makes the classification less comparable to 
other annual-data based classifications. 
                                                            
17 The classification provides a fine and a coarse classification. The fine classification consists of 1 = no separate legal 
tender, 2 = pre announced peg or currency board arrangement, 3 = pre announced horizontal band that is narrower than 
or equal to +/-2%, 4 = de facto peg, 5 = pre announced crawling peg, 6 = pre announced crawling band that is narrower 
than or equal to +/-2%, 7 = de factor crawling peg, 8 = de facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%, 
9 = pre announced crawling band that is wider than or equal to +/-2%, 10 = de facto crawling band that is narrower 
than or equal to +/-5%, 11 = moving band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% (i.e., allows for both appreciation and 
depreciation over time), 12 = managed floating, 13 = freely floating, 14 = freely falling, and 15 = dual market in which 
parallel market data is missing. The coarse one consists of 1 = the pool of the fine class 1-4, 2 = the pool of the fine 
class 5-8, 3 = the pool of the fine class 9-12, 4 = freely floating, 5 = freely falling, and 6 = dual market in which parallel 
market data is missing. 
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The above three commonly used exchange rate classifications use bilateral 
exchange rates vis-à-vis the base currency. One main problem with using the bilateral 
exchange rate is that it does not necessarily reflect a country’s overall exchange rate 
flexibility. For example, if the Chinese renminbi (RMB) is pegged to the US dollar, and 
then China is considered to maintain a fixed exchange rate. Yet the RMB floats against 
other currencies just like the dollar does. Consequently, the effective (or average) 
exchange rate of the RMB is not fixed. Moreover, the effective exchange rate would not 
necessarily be more stable when the RMB is pegged to the US dollar than when it “floats” 
against it (Ghosh et al. 2013). This shows that the bilateral exchange rate is a flawed 
measure of exchange rate flexibility in the multiple-country world. 
A more interesting question would be how closely these commonly used regime 
classifications are related to a country’s actual exchange rate flexibility. For this purpose, 
we construct four different measures of exchange rate variability: |%Δ𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑟|, |%Δ𝑛𝑏𝑒𝑟|, 
𝑆𝐷(%Δ𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑟), and 𝑆𝐷(%Δ𝑛𝑏𝑒𝑟). |%Δ𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑟| is the absolute value of annual percentage 
change in nominal effective exchange rate; |%Δ𝑛𝑏𝑒𝑟| is the absolute value of annual 
percentage change in bilateral nominal exchange rate; 𝑆𝐷(%Δ𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑟) is the standard 
deviation of monthly percentage change in nominal effective exchange rate in a yearly 
base; 𝑆𝐷(%Δ𝑛𝑏𝑒𝑟) is the standard deviation of monthly percentage change in bilateral 
nominal exchange rate also in a yearly base.18
The use of multilateral effective exchange rates is to address the issue that 
exchange rate regime classification should reflect the country’s exchange rate 
arrangement with all of its trading partners rather than just one “base” currency. But in 
order to make the exchange rate flexibility comparable to the above regime classifications 
which use bilateral exchange rate, we also use bilateral exchange rate to construct 
|%Δ𝑛𝑏𝑒𝑟| and 𝑆𝐷(%Δ𝑛𝑏𝑒𝑟). Note that we use both annual changes in the annual 
exchange rate and the standard deviation of monthly change in exchange rate on a 12-
month period. A same change in the exchange rate by the former measure can have vastly 
 A larger value of each variable means 
greater flexibility of the exchange rate.  
                                                            
18 The use of standard deviation is commonly used as a measure of exchange rate flexibility. i.e. Rose (2000), Devereux 
and Lane (2003), and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003). 
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different degrees of flexibility according to the second (SD) measure. For instance, a 
crawling peg/band would have smaller standard deviation than a conventional peg with 
the same total annual change in the exchange rate. The combination of four different 
proxies of exchange rate flexibility would give a more comprehensive and reliable 
evaluation of each regime classification.  
Table 4.1 provides a simple correlation test between these 4 measures and the 4 
popular regime classifications. The data are from the authors’ website. IMF classification 
is from Carmen Reinhart’s website. The raw data of constructed variables are from IMF’s 
international Financial Statistics (IFS). The LY-S 3-way classification and the R-R coarse 
classification are employed in the table and for other comparison results. The use of the 
LY-S 5-way and the R-R fine classification yields little difference and thus the results are 
not reported. Originally a greater value of the LY-S classification means a less flexible 
exchange rate regime, which is the opposite of the other classifications. For the purpose 
of comparison, the values are switched so that a larger value means a more flexible 
exchange rate regime.  
Several interesting results emerge. First, within the four constructed variables, 
correlation between bilateral exchange rate and multilateral effective exchange rate is 
relatively high (0.5-0.8). This suggests that a country’s currency arrangement against 
other currencies is usually dominated by one major currency. However, the effective 
exchange rate and the bilateral exchange rate move quite differently as indicated by the 
correlation coefficient that is significantly less than one. Second, the four popular regime 
classifications are correlated but not strongly correlated with each other (0.4-0.6). Frankel 
(2003) also finds low correlation between the IMF, LY-S, and RR classifications (0.2-
0.4). This lack of strong correlation reflects the difficulty of the popular regime 
classification methods to accurately code exchange rate arrangement of countries. Third, 
the correlation between the 4 measures and the existing de facto regime classifications is 
quite low (0.05-0.35). This may reflect several facts, 1) regime classifications are discrete 
measures while exchange rate flexibility measures are continuous variables, which makes 
the comparison hard to match; 2) the existing regime classifications seem to have 
difficulty coding actual behavior in the exchange rate (more discussion can be found 
below in this section); 3) some classifications such as the LY-S use information on 
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foreign reserves besides the exchange rate itself in regime classification. This seems to 
make the scheme less comparable with other classification schemes; 4) the four exchange 
rate flexibility measures employ the market rate rather than the official rate. That is why 
these measures have a higher correlation with the R-R scheme but a lower correlation 
with the K-S scheme.19
In Table 4.2, we repeat the same exercise for the two groups of countries: OECD 
and non-OECD. For OECD countries, the exchange rate regime classification fits 
exchange rate flexibility somewhat better. This seems to suggest that exchange rate 
classification is a more difficult task for developing (non-OECD) countries. Clearly, 
heterogeneity among countries makes exchange rate regime classifications more 
ambiguous.  There are several possible reasons. First, most OECD countries adopt either 
floating or fixed exchange rate regimes; few of them adopt intermediate regimes. Thus, 
regime classification in this case would be relatively straightforward.  On the other hand, 
a large proportion of non-OECD countries have employed intermediate regimes. As 
discussed earlier, it is naturally more difficult to determine exchange rate flexibility in 
intermediate regimes. For instance, if a currency is pegged to an unknown basket of 
currencies, regime classification has to determine which bilateral exchange rate to use. 
This is inevitably subjective and thus weakens the accuracy of the classifications. 
Secondly, OECD countries have a higher quality of legal system. They are more capable 
of maintaining the exchange rate regime that they choose for a longer period of time. 
Persistent regimes are more likely to be correctly captured in regime classifications than 
are temporary regimes. However, for non-OECD countries, the legal system is less 
reliable and the government is less credible. Government’s commitment toward exchange 
rate regime could be broken more easily by external negative shocks. All these result in 
frequent flippers – changing exchange rate regimes more often. This flipping activity also 
increases the difficulty of correctly identifying the exchange rate regimes in non-OECD 
countries (Alesina and Wagner 2006).   
  
                                                            
19 The R-R scheme is using market-determined exchange rate when it is available, but K-S scheme is only using official 
rate. 
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To address the country heterogeneity, Table 4.3 uses country-fixed effect panel 
regression to remove country-time invariant effect (quality of legal system) and reports 
how the exchange rate regime classification is related to actual exchange rate flexibility. 
Each regime has a corresponding dummy. The base regime (omitted group) is the fixed 
exchange rate regime. The coefficient for each regime is the difference of exchange rate 
variability between base regime and that regime.  
Reported R-squared’s are generally low, revealing the problems as mentioned in 
the previous section. Among the 4 classifications, the R-R classification has the highest 
R-squared’s suggesting that it is most closely related to actual exchange rate movement.   
Under the R-R classification, shown in the top panel, the base group is the hard peg 
coded as “1”. Interestingly, the soft pegs – coded “2” and “3” – have insignificant effects 
on exchange rate flexibility over and beyond the hard peg. However, there is a significant 
difference between hard pegs and floats (“4”). Free falling (“5”) has the highest 
variability.20
Under the LY-S classification, the base group is fixers (“1”). Intermediates (“2”) 
have exchange rate variability much larger than fixers and, interestingly, even greater 
than floaters. This result may reflect the fact that the LY-S classification is based on not 
only exchange rate movement but also variability in foreign reserves. As can be seen in 
the table of footnote 16, exchange rate variability is high for both the float and 
intermediate regimes. The two regimes are distinguished only with the combined use of 
the variability of foreign reserves.  
  
Under the K-S classification, there are only two groups – pegs and non-pegs – that 
are exclusively divided by exchange rate movement. Clearly non-pegs are more variable 
and the differences are statistically significant. The low correlation between the exchange 
rate flexibility measures and the K-S classification is probably due to the fact that the 
former employs market exchange rates while the latter does official exchange rates as 
well as the limited match between continuous numbers and the 0/1 dummy.  
                                                            
20 Group 6 is not considered because in this group countries that have a dual market do not have parallel market data for 
classification.  
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The IMF classification and the R-R coarse classification employ the same coding. 
Thus, the results are similar for the two. In particular, while floating regimes are most 
flexible, hard pegs show greater exchange rate flexibility than do soft pegs under some 
measures of exchange rate flexibility. However, the R-squared is much lower for the IMF 
classification than for the R-R, reflecting the gap between the claims of the government 
and their actual actions.  
In Tables 4.4 and 4.5, we report the same regressions estimated for the OECD and 
non-OECD countries, separately. The LY-S and the K-S classifications show similar 
patterns for both groups of countries compared to the full sample. The R-R classification, 
however, shows quite different patterns for soft pegs. For the OECD countries, soft pegs 
seem to be more flexible than floating regimes, which is in line with the phenomenon 
called the “fear of floating” (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002); yet for non-OECD countries, 
soft pegs exhibit less flexibility than hard pegs, which is consistent with “the mirage of 
fixed exchange rate” (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995). As argued by Alesina and Wagner 
(2006), “countries with poor institutional quality have difficulty in maintaining pegging 
and abandon it often. In contrast, countries with relatively good institutions display fear 
of floating, perhaps to signal their differences from those countries incapable of 
maintaining promises of monetary stability.”  
Table 4.6 compares the mean of exchange rate variability for each group under the 
four regime classifications. The R-R (except the freely falling regime “6”) and the K-S 
classifications capture exchange rate variability more consistently as the regime becomes 
more flexible, the mean of exchange rate variability increases. On the other hand, the LY-
S and the IMF de jure classifications are not necessarily correlated with actual exchange 
rate movement.  
In summary, this section compares various measures of exchange rate flexibility 
and four widely used exchange rate regime classifications. The results indicate that that 
those classifications can only partially related to actual exchange rate flexibility. This 
conclusion is obtained after considering country heterogeneity.  
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4.3. Real Exchange Rate and Current Account Adjustment: A Threshold VAR Analysis  
4.3.1. A benchmark model 
The relationship between the RER and the CA has become one of the key building 
blocks in open economy modeling. Conventional open economy models suggest that real 
appreciation (depreciation) of the domestic currency will decrease (increase) the CA 
balance. In many open-economy models, a floating exchange rate is preferred to a fixed 
exchange rate mainly because it is expected to facilitate the adjustment of the CA.21
To investigate the relation between the RER and the CA, we employ a benchmark 
vector autoregressive (VAR) model as follows: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐵(𝐿)𝑌𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑡 + 𝑈𝑡 
 
where 𝑌𝑡 is a vector of endogenous variables including the RER and the CA balances; 𝑋𝑡 
is a vector of exogenous control variables containing relative income, trade openness, and 
financial development; 𝑈𝑡 is a vector of disturbances.  
Rather than using nominal exchange rate, we use RER, which is by definition the 
nominal exchange rate adjusted for price level. In theory, CA follows the movements of 
RER either via change in price level (fixed exchange rate system) or via change in 
nominal exchange rate (floating exchange rate system). In addition, in a low-inflation 
environment, the real and nominal exchange rates move very similarly (Mussa, 1986). 
Therefore, RER is more relevant to CA adjustment than is the nominal exchange rate. For 
the RER, we use the IMF’s CPI-based real effective exchange rate, which can better 
reflect a country’s cross-country economic activities than bilateral exchange rate. As 
documented by the IMF in its IFS database, “it is designed to make it particularly 
relevant with respect to movements in costs and prices affecting exports and imports of 
manufactured goods”. Discussion about control variables can be found in data section.  
Table 4.7 employs the IPS panel unit root test (Im, Pesaran, and Shin, 2003). The 
results show that the null of unit root is strongly rejected for each variable. The VAR 
model uses a recursive ordering — 𝑌𝑡 = [𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑡 , 𝑐𝑎𝑡]. An alternative ordering does not 
change the basic finding in this paper. The lag length of the endogenous variables is two 
                                                            
21 i.e. Mundell (1962), Dornbusch (1980), and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) 
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(reasonable for annual data) and is determined by the common information criteria 
(Akaike, Bayesian, and Hannan–Quinn information criterion). The estimation method 
used for the VAR model is the least square dummy variable (LSDV) regression. Country 
dummies are included in the system as exogenous variables besides the control variables 
mentioned above. This estimation will yield similar performance as famous Arellano-
Bond type GMM estimation given the particular panel structure in this paper.22
Figure 4.1 shows the impulse responses for the benchmark model. The responses of 
the REER and CA to a shock in the REER (CA) are shown as real lines on the two panels 
on the left (right) hand side. The dotted lines show one standard deviation error bands.   
  
An increase in REER (real appreciation) deteriorates the CA although the results 
are not statistically significant. An increase in CA leads to a decline of the REER (real 
depreciation). The former is consistent with textbook models while the latter is not. 
Nonetheless, both REER and CA exhibit strong stationarity. 
4.3.2 A Threshold VAR Analysis 
One major purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the bilateral relationship 
between the REER and CA is different in different exchange rate regimes.  
As discussed in introduction section, in theory, RER will influence movements in 
CA balances through two channels – money-supply and price-level movements under a 
fixed exchange rate system or via movements in nominal exchange rate under floating 
exchange rate system. Due to sticky price, price-level adjustment is more costly than 
nominal exchange rate movement. This implies that CA adjustments would be very 
different under different exchange rate variability regimes. In addition, from the results in 
the benchmark model section, a pooled VAR system does not capture the relation 
between RER and CA very well. Therefore, there is a strong need for a test for the 
existence of any regime-switching effect (threshold effect) in the VAR model. In 
                                                            
22 In fixed effect panel model containing lags of the dependent variable, the estimator can be severely downward biased 
when the time series (T) is short regardless of the cross-sectional size of the panel (N). This is known as Hurwicz bias. 
This bias will disappear when 𝑇 → ∞. Arrellano-Bond type estimation can correct this bias by introducing instruments 
if T is small, but it will increase mean squared error due to the nature of IV estimation and more importantly will not 
correct the bias when T is large. In this paper, the panel consists of 90 countries (N=90) and 31 years (T=31). 
According to the simulation results of Alvarez & Arellano (2003), Arrellano-Bond GMM and LSDV estimation have 
similar performance when N=50-100 and T=25-50. When T=31, Hurwicz bias in LSDV is only around 3% (1/31).  
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particular, we need to see whether CA behaves very differently under different exchange 
rate flexibility regimes.  
To perform a threshold test, a threshold variable is needed. How to choose a 
threshold variable distinguishing different regimes is an important empirical question. 
Existing exchange rate regime classifications could be potential candidates as some 
studies such as Mussa (1986) show that exchange rate variability is distinctly different 
across exchange rate regimes. However, the discussion in section 3 suggests that popular 
exchange rate classification fail to reflect the degree of exchange rate flexibility. 
For the threshold variable, therefore, we use the absolute value of annual 
percentage change in real effective exchange rate obtained as  𝑠𝑡 = 100 × |log(𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑡) −
log (𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑡−1)| to capture exchange rate flexibility. If 𝑠𝑡 is a good candidate of threshold 
variables, we would expect that any threshold test will detect threshold effect from the 
VAR system. 
As discussed in section 3, exchange rate regimes are classified according to the 
behavior of the nominal exchange rates. For the following reasons, we employ the REER 
as the threshold variable. First, it is the real not nominal exchange rate that is responsible 
for the adjustment in the CA. Second, in the short run, the real and nominal exchange 
rates behave in a similar way (See Mussa (1986), Bergin et al. (2012)).  
In addition, we use annual rather than monthly data because transactions in 
international trade usually take at least several months from exchange rate changes. This 
suggests that the CA may not be sensitive to monthly exchange rate but more responsive 
to annual exchange rate. Table 4.8 shows the simple correlation test between 𝒔𝒕 (|%Δreer|) 
and regime classifications. The results have patterns similar to those of Tables 3 and 4 but 
with slightly lower values. This is not surprising since 𝒔𝒕 is in real terms but the 
comparison between regime classifications in section 3 is based on nominal terms.  
Once the threshold variable is decided, a test for the existence of regime-switching 
effect is followed. We use the arranged autoregression test proposed by Tsay’s (1998) to 
test the null of no threshold effects.23
                                                            
23 The Arranged Autoregression Test first runs recursive least squares estimations, with the data points added in the 
order of the test threshold variable, and then compares residuals from recursive least squares estimation with those from 
 The test strongly rejects the null of no threshold 
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effect with a p-value of 0. Therefore, a regime-switching model is required in the 
benchmark VAR system.    
Overall, the above discussion suggests that the bilateral relationship between the 
RER and the CA may differ under different exchange rate regimes. In order to test the 
hypothesis, we employ a regime-switching model in the section.  
In general, models with hidden regimes require a Markov switching type model, 
while models with observable regimes need a Threshold VAR type model. In this paper, 
we employ a threshold VAR model (TVAR) since the threshold variable can be well 
specified in this study. A similar method has been used in Balke (2000) and Afonso et al. 
(2011). Balke (2000) uses credit market condition as a threshold variable and see how 
output, inflation, federal funds rate, and credit can behave differently under “tight” and 
“normal” credit regimes. Afonso et al. (2011) use financial stress index as a threshold 
variable and study whether the effects of fiscal policy on economic activity differ 
depending on financial market conditions. Both papers have a clear cut-off for different 
regimes, so the Threshold VAR is adopted as the first choice. 
 A Threshold VAR is specified as follows: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐵1(𝐿)𝑌𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑡 + (𝐵2(𝐿)𝑌𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑡)𝐼[𝑠𝑡−𝑑 > 𝛾] + 𝑈𝑡 
where 𝑌𝑡 is a vector of endogenous variables including the RER and the CA balances; 𝑋𝑡 
is a vector of exogenous control variables containing relative income, trade openness, and 
financial development; 𝐵1(𝐿) and 𝐵2(𝐿) are lag polynomial matrices; 𝑠𝑡−𝑑 is the 
threshold variable that determines which regime the system is; 𝑈𝑡 is disturbance; and 
𝐼[𝑠𝑡−𝑑 > 𝛾] is an indicator function that equals 1 when 𝑠𝑡−𝑑 > 𝛾, and 0 otherwise. In 
particular, the absolute value of the annual percentage change in RER would be the 
natural threshold variable, 𝑠𝑡−𝑑, that distinguishes exchange rate regimes. If 𝑠𝑡−𝑑 is large 
enough to surpass an unknown threshold value 𝛾, the system is in high exchange rate 
variability regime. Otherwise, the system is in low exchange rate variability regime.  
Tsay’s test suggests a threshold effect. However, the test does not return the 
threshold value. To find the threshold value, we first search the threshold variable and list 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
least squares estimation using all data points. Under the null of no break, the residuals should be fairly similar to the 
least squares residuals, so there should be no correlation between the recursive residuals and the regressors. 
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all possible threshold values. And then we calculate the log likelihood of the VAR system 
for each threshold value and find the threshold value yielding the largest log likelihood. 
To guard against overfitting, the possible threshold values are restricted so that at least 15% 
of the observations plus the number of parameters (for an individual equation) are in each 
regime.    
One advantage of VAR analysis is that it provides the dynamics of endogenous 
variables in the system through impulse response (IRFs) analysis. In a linear model, the 
impulse responses are not history-dependent and the magnitude of the shock does not 
alter the time profile of the responses. However, this is no longer true for non-linear 
models such as Threshold VAR. The IRFs are now conditional on the entire past history 
of the variables and the size and direction of the shock. For instance, in our case, if the 
change in RER is far below the threshold value, the model is under the low exchange rate 
variability regime and the IRFs are generated using this branch of the whole system. If an 
exchange rate shock to the low variability regime system is large enough, the system can 
jump into the high variability regime system. To deal with these two issues, Koop et al. 
(1996) propose generalized impulse response functions (GIRFs) defined as the difference 
between the forecasted paths of variables with and without a shock to a variable of 
interest. Formally, the GIRFs are defined as: 
𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑦(𝑘, 𝜖𝑡 ,Ω𝑡−1) = 𝐸(𝑌𝑡+𝑘|𝜖𝑡 ,Ω𝑡−1) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑡+𝑘|Ω𝑡−1) 
where 𝑌𝑡+𝑘 is a vector of variables at horizon k, Ω𝑡−1 is the information set available 
before the time of shock t. This formulation implies that the impulse response functions 
depend on the initial condition and that the same shocks with different signs may 
generate asymmetric responses.  
To generate GIRFs, the conditional expectations, 𝐸(𝑌𝑡+𝑘|𝜖𝑡 ,Ω𝑡−1) and 
𝐸(𝑌𝑡+𝑘|Ω𝑡−1), must be calculated by simulating the model. First, a sequence of shocks 
for the periods from 0 to k is drawn randomly and then is fed through the model for a 
given initial condition (Ω𝑡−1) to produce forecasts. Second, for the same sequence of 
shocks, an additional random shock is added at period 0, and then the modified sequence 
is fed through the model again to produce another group of forecasts. The difference 
between these two forecasts is the impulse response function. The whole simulation is 
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repeated 5000 times, and the resulting average is the estimated GIRF. Third, the initial 
conditions for each regime are used to generate GIRFs for both regimes. Fourth, the 
confidence bands are derived from the quantiles of the distribution of the average GIRFs, 
which are generated from the 5000 draw mentioned above. The reported error band is the 
16.5th and 83.5th percentile of the distribution.24
4.4. Data 
 
The dataset used in this paper covers 90 countries from 1980 to 2010. Sample 
countries involve both developing and developed countries. Table 4.9 lists all countries 
included in this paper.  
The real effective exchange rate data is from the IMF’s IFS. It is the ratio 
(expressed on the base 2005=100) of an index of a currency’s period average exchange 
rate to a weighted geometric average of exchange rates for the currencies of selected 
countries, adjusted for relative movements in national price of the home country and 
selected countries. An increase in the index means real appreciation. This is a trade-
weighted multilateral exchange rate adjusted for CPI-based price level. It is designed to 
make it particularly relevant with respect to movements in costs and prices affecting 
exports and imports of manufactured goods, which is very suitable for the study in this 
paper.  
The current account balances, defined as the ratio of current account balance to 
GDP, are from World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI).  
Trade openness, defined as (exports + imports)/GDP, is from Penn World table 7.0 
(PWT7.0). Financial development is proxied by the private credit/GDP ratio and obtained 
from WDI. Greater trade openness makes it easier for trade and therefore facilitates CA 
adjustment, while greater financial development makes it easier to finance CA balance, 
resulting in slower CA adjustment. 
                                                            
24 The reported band includes around ± 1 standard deviation in a standard normal distribution. As argued 
by Miniane & Rogers (2007), this confidence band is “conservative”, in the sense that it will lead us to find 
more evidence of a significant effect, compared to using a wider ± 2 standard deviations band. In turn, this 
makes the finding of essentially no significant effect even stronger. 
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Relative income, defined as (per capita GDP)/(US per capita GDP), is a proxy for a 
country’s development stage. It is obtained from PWT7.0. Countries in different 
development stage may have different saving and investment decisions, thus affecting the 
CA balances.  
Table 4.10 provides a summary statistics of all variables used in this study. The 
sample mea of the CA balance is -3.12%. The range of the CA balance is really broad, 
from -132.80% to 38.60%. The record CA deficit and surplus are created by Equatorial 
Guinea in 1996 and Trinidad and Tobago in 2006, respectively. The real effective 
exchange rate has a mean of 123.26. Ghana experienced the highest exchange rate, 
3578.93, in 1983; while Poland experienced the lowest exchange rate, 37.51, in 1990 
when the economy was in transition. Nominal effective exchange rate has a really large 
mean due to the outlier – Brazil from 1980 to 1988.  
4.5. Empirical Results 
As mentioned in section 4, a natural threshold variable for the model is the absolute 
value of annual percentage change in the RER measured as 𝑠𝑡 = 100 × |log(𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑡) −
log (𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑡−1)|. We consider the choice reasonable since the transactions in international 
trade usually completed in several months or more. With the chosen threshold variable, 
we perform the Tsay’s test to detect the significance of the threshold effect. The test 
result strongly rejects the null of no threshold effect with a p-value of 0. Then, we 
calculate the log likelihood of the system within each branch of the model for all possible 
threshold values and find the threshold value maximizing log likelihood. A complete 
search returns a threshold value of 7.41. That is, if the absolute value of percentage 
change in the RER is less (more) than 7.41 percent, then the observation is considered to 
be in the low (high) exchange rate variability (ERV) regime.  
The selected threshold value will split the whole sample into two sub-samples—
low and high exchange rate variability regime respectively. The same VAR system is 
estimated for the two sub-samples. Table 4.11 reports the estimation results in each 
regime. The persistency of the CA balances under two different regimes are of particular 
interest. Under the low ERV regime, the coefficients for the first and second lag of CA 
are 0.82 and -0.15, respectively. Under the high ERV regime, they are 0.64 and -0.13, 
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respectively. Both are statistically significant at the 1% level. This suggests that the CA 
balance is more persistent in the low ERV regime. In other words, the CA balance is 
adjusted more quickly when the RER is more flexible. This is consistent with the 
hypothesis of Friedman (1953).  
The estimation results of a VAR model can be better summarized by impulse 
responses. For each regime, GIRFs are generated under different initial conditions.25
In Figure 4.2.3, solid (dotted) line is the GIRFs for the low (high) ERV regime. The 
left-side panel shows the responses to a unit shock in RER. The upper-left chart is the 
responses of RER (domestic currency appreciation). Interestingly, the shock is temporary 
under high ERV regime, but is permanent under low ERV regime. One explanation could 
be due to the natural of each regime. In the low ERV regime, once a shock changes the 
RER, RER is not allowed to re-adjust accordingly, so it is more persistent; while in the 
high ERV regime exchange rate can correspond to the shock immediately, and the shock 
will disappear as time goes. The lower-left chart is the response of CA. In the low ERV 
regime, after currency appreciation, the CA starts to decrease gradually because net 
exports will decrease following appreciation. RER is hardly allowed to adjust accordingly 
for rebalancing the relative price of imports and exports, so country has less ability to 
prevent deterioration of the CA. In the high variability regime, the adjustment of CA 
balance is similar to that of the J-curve effect, although the adjustment is not very 
significant. Flexible exchange rate will adjust relative price of imports and exports and 
rebalance the CA.  
 
Figure 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 report the GIRFs of low and high variability regime with 
confidence intervals, respectively. To make a better comparison and read more clearly 
any potential difference between the two regimes, Figure 4.2.3 groups two regimes’ 
GIRFs without confidence intervals.  
The right-side panel shows the responses to a unit shock in CA. The upper-right 
chart is the response of RER. In the low ERV regime, there is a real appreciation 
                                                            
25 In particular, some initial values of CA and RER are drawn from the low flexibility regime subsample and are 
imposed to the model for the graph in Figure 1. Similarly, initial values of CA and RER are drawn from the high 
flexibility regime subsample and are imposed to the model for the graph in Figure 2. Different initial conditions have 
been tried and yield very similar GIRFs.  
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following CA improvement, although the response is minimal due to limited ERV; in the 
high ERV regime, the RER decreases (depreciation) after CA improvement, which 
contradicts with conventional open economy models. The lower-right chart is the 
response of CA. In both regimes, the shock will decay over time. However, the speed of 
CA reversion seems faster in high ERV regime than in the low ERV regime. The half-
lives of CA are about 1.3 and 2.2 years for high and low ERV regimes, respectively. This 
is consistent with Friedman’s hypothesis that greater exchange rate variability facilitates 
CA adjustment.  
4.6. Analysis from Threshold VAR under R-R and K-S exchange rate regime 
classifications 
The results in section 3 suggest that the R-R and K-S classifications outperform 
other regime classifications in terms of capturing exchange rate flexibility. In this section 
we employ the R-R and K-S classifications and repeat the Threshold VAR analysis. The 
threshold value for the R-R classification is 4 using the same technique discussed in 
section 3, which split the sample into two parts – floaters (high ERV regime including 
floating and free falling) and non-floaters (low ERV regime including others). In section 
3, we have showed that floaters indeed have a greater ERV than non-floaters. This 
splitting lets R-R valid to use without losing the appropriate exchange rate variability.26
Figure 4.3 reports the GIRFs using the R-R classification. Figure 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 
report the GIRFs for low and high ERV regime with confidence intervals, respectively; 
Figure 4.3.3 does the comparison between two regimes. Overall, results in Figure 4.3 are 
similar to those in Figure 4.2. There are some differences. First, Responses of RER to its 
own shock under less and more flexible exchange rate regimes are both decays over time. 
That is the RER shows mean reversion in both regimes, but the half-life is much longer in 
 
The K-S classification is a bilateral classification, so the threshold value is 1. It splits 
sample into pegs and non-pegs. Again, from the results in section 3, non-pegs have a 
greater ERV than pegs. 
                                                            
26 In Chinn and Wei’s paper, they also use the R-R classification, but their use (grouping fixers, soft-pegs, and floaters) 
does not necessarily reflect the order of exchange rate variability because R-R classification does not distinguish fixers 
and soft-pegs well in terms of exchange rate variability. 
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high ERV regime than in low ERV regime. Second, in the high ERV regime, in response 
to an increase in CA, the RER increases initially (real appreciation) although it is not very 
significant. Nonetheless, the estimated speed of mean reversion for the CA seems similar 
in both Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3. The half-lives for CA in high and low ERV regimes are 
about 0.7 and 1.8 years respectively. The difference is 1.1 years which are even larger 
compared to Figure 4.2. This is even a stronger support to Friedman’s hypothesis. 
Figure 4.4 reports the GIRFs using the K-S classification. Figure 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 
report the GIRFs of pegged and non-pegged exchange rate regime with confidence 
intervals, respectively; Figure 4.4.3 compares the two regimes. Main results in Figure 4.4 
are comparable and similar to those in Figure 4.2 and 4.3 with some exceptions. The 
response of RER is persistent when there is a RER shock in the fixed exchange rate 
regime. Two reasons may be offered. First, the exchange rate is fixed by the government. 
Second, if the home country experiences a higher inflation than the base country, the 
RER will even appreciate further if the nominal exchange rate is fixed. However, a 
positive RER shock improves the CA, which contradicts with conventional textbook 
models and results from other regimes classifications.  
4.7. Conclusion 
Friedman’s hypothesis that flexible exchange rate can facilitate current account 
adjustment has been asserted as obvious for a long time. However, a recent study by 
Chinn and Wei (2013) shows that there is no such evidence to support the hypothesis. In 
this paper, we reconsider the hypothesis and extend empirical analysis in at least three 
dimensions. First, our study uses a large panel dataset containing a long time series (up to 
2010). Second, we measure exchange rate variability using the actual market effective 
exchange rates instead of bilateral rates against the base country or using existing popular 
regime classifications. Third, we employ a threshold VAR model and classify exchange 
rate regimes based on actual exchange rate movements.  
There are two main findings in our study. First, the speed of mean reversion of 
current account balance is higher in a regime with greater exchange rate variability. This 
result is consistent with Friedman’s hypothesis. Second, by utilizing our own constructed 
exchange rate variability variables, we find that some existing exchange rate 
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classifications, especially those used in Chinn and Wei (2013)’s study, may not capture 
actual exchange rate variability as well as expected. The unconventional result from 
Chinn and Wei (2013) is probably due to the inability of capturing exchange rate 
variability by some regime classifications for certain exchange rate regimes.  
Hence, two implications follow our study. First, adpoting a more flexible exchange 
rate regime is still a useful tool for a country to adjust its external balance. Second, there 
is a disconnection between acutal exchange rate variablity and some popular bilateral 
exchange rate classifications. Future work may need to rethink the use of these 
classifications as a proxy to actual exchange rate variability.    
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Figure 4.1. IRFs for real exchange rate and the ccurrent account balances using basic 
VAR 
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Figure 4.2. GIRFs using log different in RER as exchange rate regime classification 
Figure 4.2.1: GIRFs under low ERV regime 
  
Figure 4.2.2: GIRFs under high ERV regime 
 
Figure 4.2.3: Comparison of GIRFs between low and high ERV regime 
 
Dotted line: High ERV regime; Solid line: Low ERV regime 
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Figure 4.3. GIRFs using the R-R classification as exchange rate regime classification 
Figure 4.3.1: GIRFs under low ERV regime  
 
Figure 4.3.2: GIRFs under high ERV regime  
 
Figure 4.3.3: Comparison of GIRFs between low and high ERV regimes  
 
Dotted line: High ERV regime; Solid line: Low ERV regime 
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Figure 4.4. GIRFs using the K-S classification as exchange rate regime classification 
Figure 4.4.1: GIRFs under pegged exchange rate regime 
 
Figure 4.4.2: GIRFs under non-pegged exchange rate regime  
 
Figure 4.4.3: Comparison of GIRFs betwwen pegged and non-pegged exchange rate regimes 
 
Dotted line: Non-pegged exchange rate regime; Solid line: Pegged exchange rate regime 
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Table 4.1. Correlation test between different exchange rate regime classifications 
  |%Δneer| |%Δnber| SD(%Δneer) SD(%Δnber) IMF R-R LY-S K-S 
|%Δneer| 1 
      
 
|%Δnber| 0.7806 1 
     
 
SD(%Δneer) 0.6065 0.6491 1 
    
 
SD(%Δnber) 0.5116 0.8022 0.7807 1 
   
 
IMF 0.1106 0.1437 0.075 0.0969 1 
  
 
R-R 0.3288 0.3506 0.2958 0.2928 0.5627 1 
 
 
LY-S 0.0796 0.1248 0.0653 0.1099 0.533 0.4571 1  
K-S 0.1723 0.2238 0.1841 0.2107 0.5966 0.5853 0.6177 1 
Note: |%Δneer| denotes absolute value of annual percentage change in nominal effective exchange rate; 
|%Δnber| denotes the absolute value of annual percentage change in bilateral nominal exchange rate;  
SD(%Δneer) denotes the standard deviation of monthly percentage change in nominal effective exchange 
rate in a yearly base;  SD(%Δnber) denotes the standard deviation of monthly percentage change in bilateral 
nominal exchange rate in a yearly base; IMF stands for IMF de jure exchange rate regime classification; R-
R stands for Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) de facto exchange rate regime classification; LY-S stands for Levy-
Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) de facto exchange rate regime classification; K-S stands for Klein and 
Shambaugh (2008) de facto exchange rate regime classification. 
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Table 4.2. Correlation test: OECD and non-OECD 
OECD |%Δneer| |%Δnber| SD(%Δneer) SD(%Δnber) IMF R-R LY-S K-S 
|%Δneer| 1 
      
 
|%Δnber| 0.7732 1 
     
 
SD(%Δneer) 0.5213 0.5028 1 
    
 
SD(%Δnber) 0.4421 0.6013 0.7833 1 
   
 
IMF 0.2655 0.2718 0.489 0.5156 1 
  
 
R-R 0.3796 0.4574 0.5258 0.6935 0.641 1 
 
 
LY-S 0.268 0.3232 0.4179 0.5691 0.6216 0.6736 1  
K-S 0.2913 0.4602 0.4821 0.6842 0.5961 0.6501 0.5659 1 
Non-OECD  
|%Δneer| 1 
      
 
|%Δnber| 0.7709 1 
     
 
SD(%Δneer) 0.5926 0.639 1 
    
 
SD(%Δnber) 0.4962 0.8014 0.7742 1 
   
 
IMF 0.1293 0.1676 0.0694 0.0808 1 
  
 
R-R 0.3467 0.3604 0.3039 0.2762 0.5399 1 
 
 
LY-S 0.0755 0.1237 0.0496 0.079 0.479 0.352 1  
K-S 0.1993 0.2396 0.2038 0.2025 0.5963 0.5646 0.6528 1 
Note: |%Δneer| denotes absolute value of annual percentage change in nominal effective exchange rate; 
|%Δnber| denotes the absolute value of annual percentage change in bilateral nominal exchange rate;  
SD(%Δneer) denotes the standard deviation of monthly percentage change in nominal effective exchange 
rate in a yearly base;  SD(%Δnber) denotes the standard deviation of monthly percentage change in bilateral 
nominal exchange rate in a yearly base; IMF stands for IMF de jure exchange rate regime classification; R-
R stands for Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) de facto exchange rate regime classification; LY-S stands for Levy-
Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) de facto exchange rate regime classification; K-S stands for Klein and 
Shambaugh (2008) de facto exchange rate regime classification. 
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Table 4.3. Country fixed effect panel regression 
Dependent variables |%Δneer| |%Δnber| SD(%Δneer) SD(%Δnber) 
R-R classification     
2 -2.818 -0.635 -0.458 -0.205 
 (1.969) (2.005) (0.353) (0.363) 
3 -2.215 3.644 0.482 0.668 
 (2.290) (2.337) (0.412) (0.425) 
4 12.42*** 10.20*** 0.954 1.464** 
 (3.627) (3.735) (0.667) (0.688) 
5 47.15*** 54.44*** 6.096*** 6.350*** 
 (2.688) (2.793) (0.484) (0.508) 
6 2.063 5.358 1.020 1.594* 
 (4.833) (4.930) (0.881) (0.906) 
Constant 7.900*** 5.885*** 1.618*** 1.439*** 
 (1.299) (1.318) (0.234) (0.240) 
Observations 2,138 2,111 2,217 2,191 
R-squared 0.219 0.229 0.113 0.104 
Number of countries 88 88 88 88 
LY-S classification     
2 17.10*** 24.68*** 4.076*** 5.267*** 
 (1.966) (2.024) (0.347) (0.359) 
3 3.518* 9.060*** 1.391*** 2.369*** 
 (2.130) (2.173) (0.374) (0.383) 
Constant 7.426*** 4.332*** 1.114*** 0.576*** 
 (0.977) (0.997) (0.171) (0.175) 
Observations 1,719 1,696 1,784 1,761 
R-squared 0.051 0.088 0.079 0.115 
Number of countries 88 88 88 88 
K-S classification     
Non-peg 5.548*** 10.05*** 1.811*** 2.664*** 
 (1.607) (1.566) (0.288) (0.306) 
Constant 8.151*** 5.334*** 1.135*** 0.651*** 
 (1.048) (1.017) (0.187) (0.198) 
Observations 1,896 1,871 1,975 1,951 
R-squared 0.007 0.022 0.020 0.039 
Number of countries 79 79 79 79 
IMF classification     
2 -1.162 -1.250 -0.446 0.114 
 (2.496) (2.572) (0.458) (0.469) 
3 -0.888 2.660 -0.814** 0.0349 
 (1.894) (1.975) (0.340) (0.351) 
4 3.758* 7.223*** -0.0931 1.435*** 
 (2.162) (2.272) (0.387) (0.403) 
5 8.286 20.50* 2.159 4.135** 
 (11.20) (11.47) (2.060) (2.097) 
Constant 10.82*** 9.301*** 2.522*** 1.885*** 
 (1.119) (1.174) (0.200) (0.207) 
Observations 1,917 1,889 1,985 1,958 
R-squared 0.003 0.007 0.005 0.010 
Number of countries 89 89 89 89 
Note: in LY-S, IMF, and R-R, small value mean more fixed exchange rate regime and vice versa. For 
detailed description of each value, see footnotes for LY-S and R-R in section 3. In K-S, non-peg means a 
non-fixed exchange rate regime. IMF classification is from Carmen Reinhart’s website, the definition of 
each value is equivalent to R-R coarse regime classification. 
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Table 4.4. Country fixed effect panel regression: OECD 
Dependent variables |%Δneer| |%Δnber| SD(%Δneer) SD(%Δnber) 
R-R classification     
2 3.239*** 5.471*** 0.262*** 0.741*** 
 (0.561) (0.671) (0.0841) (0.0884) 
3 4.188*** 5.745*** 0.656*** 0.912*** 
 (0.789) (0.947) (0.118) (0.124) 
4 1.696 3.016* 0.550*** 0.754*** 
 (1.422) (1.700) (0.211) (0.222) 
5 39.69*** 39.80*** 2.582*** 3.072*** 
 (2.611) (3.123) (0.360) (0.378) 
6 - - - - 
 - - - - 
Constant 2.134*** 1.523*** 0.818*** 0.747*** 
 (0.420) (0.502) (0.0639) (0.0671) 
Observations 680 676 705 702 
R-squared 0.269 0.232 0.098 0.152 
Number of countries 26 26 26 26 
LY-S classification     
2 4.273*** 5.129*** 0.0411 0.248** 
 (0.828) (0.997) (0.104) (0.121) 
3 4.255*** 5.002*** 0.646*** 0.984*** 
 (0.804) (0.968) (0.101) (0.117) 
Constant 2.583*** 2.834*** 0.920*** 0.976*** 
 (0.387) (0.466) (0.0488) (0.0566) 
Observations 524 524 543 543 
R-squared 0.073 0.071 0.082 0.123 
Number of countries 26 26 26 26 
K-S classification     
Non-peg 2.526*** 5.093*** 0.491*** 0.992*** 
 (0.624) (0.726) (0.0809) (0.0862) 
Constant 3.138*** 2.240*** 0.835*** 0.708*** 
 (0.438) (0.510) (0.0568) (0.0605) 
Observations 576 576 600 600 
R-squared 0.029 0.082 0.060 0.187 
Number of countries 24 24 24 24 
IMF classification     
2 0.554 1.426** 0.212*** 0.496*** 
 (0.579) (0.669) (0.0748) (0.0841) 
3 4.358*** 5.840*** 0.484*** 0.751*** 
 (0.725) (0.857) (0.0920) (0.105) 
4 1.491* 0.577 0.717*** 0.679*** 
 (0.840) (0.973) (0.105) (0.119) 
5 - - - - 
 - - - - 
Constant 3.291*** 3.799*** 0.777*** 0.867*** 
 (0.396) (0.462) (0.0501) (0.0566) 
Observations 671 666 693 690 
R-squared 0.054 0.072 0.087 0.120 
Number of countries 26 26 26 26 
Note: in LY-S, IMF, and R-R, small value mean more fixed exchange rate regime and vice versa. For 
detailed description of each value, see footnotes for LY-S and R-R in section 3. In K-S, non-peg means a 
non-fixed exchange rate regime. IMF classification is from Carmen Reinhart’s website, the definition of 
each value is equivalent to R-R coarse regime classification. 
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Table 4.5. Country fixed effect panel regression: Non-OECD 
Dependent variables |%Δneer| |%Δnber| SD(%Δneer) SD(%Δnber) 
R-R classification     
2 -8.344** -7.213** -1.234** -1.229* 
 (3.446) (3.523) (0.608) (0.631) 
3 -6.436* 0.473 0.151 0.222 
 (3.567) (3.654) (0.635) (0.661) 
4 12.18** 9.045 0.741 1.231 
 (5.354) (5.535) (0.984) (1.021) 
5 43.55*** 50.96*** 5.765*** 5.877*** 
 (3.840) (3.976) (0.683) (0.720) 
6 -1.121 1.844 0.625 1.062 
 (6.184) (6.323) (1.120) (1.159) 
Constant 12.60*** 10.22*** 2.224*** 2.084*** 
 (2.119) (2.156) (0.373) (0.387) 
Observations 1,458 1,435 1,512 1,489 
R-squared 0.224 0.236 0.117 0.110 
Number of countries 62 62 62 62 
LY-S classification     
2 20.68*** 30.90*** 5.283*** 6.883*** 
 (2.698) (2.781) (0.472) (0.489) 
3 3.754 11.70*** 1.842*** 3.160*** 
 (3.020) (3.078) (0.525) (0.537) 
Constant 9.363*** 4.878*** 1.190*** 0.395 
 (1.357) (1.382) (0.234) (0.240) 
Observations 1,195 1,172 1,241 1,218 
R-squared 0.060 0.107 0.103 0.150 
Number of countries 62 62 62 62 
K-S classification     
Non-peg 7.013*** 12.54*** 2.407*** 3.456*** 
 (2.329) (2.280) (0.414) (0.443) 
Constant 10.35*** 6.722*** 1.302*** 0.660** 
 (1.468) (1.426) (0.260) (0.277) 
Observations 1,320 1,295 1,375 1,351 
R-squared 0.007 0.024 0.025 0.045 
Number of countries 55 55 55 55 
IMF classification     
2 -5.720 -9.153 -2.107* -0.966 
 (5.967) (6.265) (1.096) (1.147) 
3 -2.844 1.683 -1.481*** -0.207 
 (2.826) (2.955) (0.505) (0.525) 
4 3.240 8.283** -0.696 1.499** 
 (3.205) (3.401) (0.573) (0.603) 
5 7.289 20.89 1.563 4.099 
 (13.92) (14.25) (2.560) (2.616) 
Constant 15.59*** 13.27*** 3.546*** 2.570*** 
 (1.718) (1.811) (0.304) (0.318) 
Observations 1,246 1,223 1,292 1,268 
R-squared 0.005 0.010 0.009 0.012 
Number of code_ifs 63 63 63 63 
Note: in LY-S, IMF, and R-R, small value mean more fixed exchange rate regime and vice versa. For 
detailed description of each value, see footnotes for LY-S and R-R in section 3. In K-S, non-peg means a 
non-fixed exchange rate regime. IMF classification is from Carmen Reinhart’s website, the definition of 
each value is equivalent to R-R coarse regime classification. 
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Table 4.6. Mean of exchange rate flexibility variables by exchange rate regimes 
  |%Δneer| |%Δnber| SD(%Δneer) SD(%Δnber) 
R-R classification 
    1 5.329 4.536 1.249 1.154 
2 6.551 7.084 1.395 1.363 
3 8.358 10.077 2.188 2.180 
4 11.016 10.962 2.204 2.811 
5 63.142 63.090 8.591 8.579 
6 10.314 13.560 3.396 3.544 
LY-S classification 
    1 6.666 5.259 1.426 1.120 
2 28.284 28.100 4.998 5.123 
3 9.707 12.042 1.950 2.271 
K-S classification 
    Peg 5.285 3.743 1.122 0.795 
Non-peg 15.836 16.581 2.956 3.205 
IMF classification 
    1 8.443 8.650 2.110 2.054 
2 4.674 3.282 0.938 0.831 
3 14.130 14.708 2.289 2.192 
4 16.426 17.087 3.012 3.320 
5 14.657 23.213 4.344 5.144 
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Table 4.7. IPS panel unit root test 
H0: unit root 
Variable N T T stat P-value Result 
CA 90 8 to 30 -8.55 0 Reject 
REER 90 16 to 30 -3.55 0 Reject 
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Table 4.8. Correlation test between real effective exchange rate and regime 
classifications 
Sample 
 
IMF R-R LY-S K-S 
All countries 
|%Δreer| 
0.0326 0.2968 0.0269 0.1341 
OECD 0.3207 0.3404 0.253 0.3147 
Non-OECD 0.0158 0.2941 -0.0038 0.1356 
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Table 4.9. List of countries in the dataset 
High income Middle income Low income 
Antigua and Barbuda Algeria Nigeria Burundi 
Australia Armenia Pakistan Central African Republic 
Austria Belize Papua New Guinea Gambia, The 
Bahamas, The Bolivia Paraguay Ghana 
Bahrain Brazil Philippines Malawi 
Belgium Bulgaria Poland Sierra Leone 
Canada Cameroon Russia Togo 
Croatia Chile Samoa Uganda 
Cyprus China,P.R.: Mainland Solomon Islands Zambia 
Czech Republic Colombia South Africa 
Denmark Costa Rica St. Kitts and Nevis 
Equatorial Guinea Côte d'Ivoire St. Lucia 
 Finland Dominica St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
France Dominican Republic Tunisia 
 Germany Ecuador Ukraine 
 Greece Fiji Uruguay 
 Hungary Gabon Venezuela, Rep. Bol. 
Iceland Georgia 
  Ireland Grenada 
  Israel Guyana 
  Italy Iran, Islamic Republic of 
Japan Lesotho 
  Luxembourg Macedonia 
 Malta Malaysia 
  Netherlands Mexico 
  New Zealand Moldova 
  Norway Morocco 
  Portugal 
   Saudi Arabia 
  Singapore 
   Slovak Republic 
  Spain 
   Sweden 
   Switzerland 
  Trinidad and Tobago 
  United Kingdom 
  United States     
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Table 4.10. Summary statistics 
Variable Description Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ca Current account balances 2517 -3.115 8.986 -132.796 38.594 
reer Real effective exchange rate 2661 123.264 117.986 37.510 3578.930 
fin_dvp Financial development 2618 54.148 45.708 1.385 319.461 
openc Trade openness  2686 83.204 51.968 3.843 440.432 
relative_inc Relative income 2686 37.106 34.278 0.877 204.514 
neer Nominal effective exchange rate 2635 4.27E+09 1.22E+11 0.72 4.92E+12 
SD(%Δneer) SD(%Δneer) 2636 2.132566 4.203309 0.043556 83.15371 
SD(%Δnber) SD(%Δneer) 2605 2.092276 4.303915 0 81.30399 
IMF IMF regime classification 2022 2.363501 1.246832 1 5 
R-R R-R regime classification 2257 2.280461 1.297752 1 6 
LY-S LY-S regime classification 1810 2.303315 0.845265 1 3 
K-S K-S regime classification 2000 0.4295 0.495129 0 1 
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Table 4.11. Adjustment of current account balance under low and high flexibility 
regimes 
  Low exchange rate flexibility regime High exchange rate flexibility regime 
Dependent variable:  
Real exchange rate Coeff       SD T-Stat P-value Coeff       SD T-Stat P-value 
REER {1} 1.043 0.007 149.707 0.000 0.566 0.045 12.501 0.000 
REER {2} -0.030 0.007 -4.267 0.000 -0.001 0.044 -0.022 0.983 
CA {1} 0.029 0.021 1.377 0.169 -0.278 1.251 -0.222 0.824 
CA {2} -0.038 0.022 -1.777 0.076 -0.817 1.245 -0.656 0.512 
Constant -0.299 1.384 -0.216 0.829 37.922 66.907 0.567 0.571 
RELATIVE_INC 0.064 0.019 3.404 0.001 1.747 1.451 1.204 0.229 
OPENC -0.014 0.007 -2.067 0.039 -1.325 0.520 -2.551 0.011 
FIN_DVP -0.001 0.004 -0.207 0.836 0.101 0.372 0.271 0.786 
Dependent variable:  
Current account balance               
REER {1} -0.006 0.008 -0.711 0.477 0.001 0.002 0.669 0.504 
REER {2} 0.002 0.008 0.234 0.815 -0.001 0.002 -0.391 0.696 
CA {1} 0.822 0.025 33.411 0.000 0.639 0.050 12.820 0.000 
CA {2} -0.148 0.025 -5.893 0.000 -0.132 0.050 -2.650 0.008 
Constant -1.853 1.612 -1.150 0.250 -0.586 2.667 -0.220 0.826 
RELATIVE_INC 0.038 0.022 1.721 0.085 -0.035 0.058 -0.609 0.543 
OPENC -0.008 0.008 -1.002 0.317 0.023 0.021 1.131 0.259 
FIN_DVP -0.011 0.005 -2.432 0.015 -0.018 0.015 -1.227 0.221 
Note: the country dummies are included in each regression but not reported. 
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